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1INTRODUCTION
Tine policy of nonalignment has been an active force
in international relations for over twenty years. It found
acceptance among a wide range of nations with differing
political and ideological outlooks. However, they did share
an aversion to big power politics and a desire to be more
tnan a mere pawn in the struggle for "influence" by the
super powers. The majority of these countries were of the
so called Third World, that vast area encompassing Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. Despite a wide divergence in
history and culture, they share one dominant characteristic
in the present era; that is, a depressing level of poverty
and economic underdevelopment.
Rather Incongruously
,
one of the leaders of this
movement was Yugoslavia, a white European state and rather
rich compared to the states of the Third World. How Yugo-
slavia came to Join and lead the ranks of the nonaligned
Is one of the cnief concerns of this paper. Yugoslavia was
and is a communist state led by men who have devoted their
entire lives to that cause. Thus, their expulsion from the
Cominform in 1948 was a severe psychological blow. The
Yugoslav leadership literally did not know which way to
turn. It was in this period that Yugoslavia came closest
to actually Joining the West.
2however, the international system was being shaped
by two new forces at this time. The first was tne confronta-
tion between the Soviet Union and the United States which
cast the world into a bipolar shape for over twenty years.
Ihe second significant event was the disintegration of
colonialism which proceeded at an amazing pace in the post
rforld Alar 11 years. Many of these new states Joined the
fledging movement of nonalignuent
. The successes and fail-
ures of this international movement is one focus of this
paper.
Yugoslavia came to Know tne movement through associa-
tion with several of these states chiefly at the United
Nations. Yugoslavia Joined the movement because it seemed
to answer many of the problems Yugoslavia faced in the
foreign policy field. She also Joined for several purely
domestic reasons which, surprisingly, paralleled those of
the new Third World states. The success or failure of non-
alignment as a foreign policy for Yugoslavia is also a
central concern of this paper.
finally, we will discuss the future of nonalignment,
both an an international movement and as a foreign policy
for Yugoslavia. Nonalignment was a response to an inter-
national system largely shaped by two major forces growing
out of World War 11 and its aftermath. A central question
then is whether or not the international system has changed
3and, if so, is the policy of nonalignment relevant now
and in the foreseeable future.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015
https://archive.org/details/evolutionofyugosOOconn
4CHAPTER 1
THE BREAK WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Yugoslavia was the first country to consciously and
successfully conduct a foreign policy outside of the dom-
ination of either the Soviet or American blocs. This rad-
ical new policy did not come about over night. In fact,
the policy of nonalignment came about only after Yugoslavia’s
expulsion from the international communist community in
June of 1948. This was the single most important event in
the development of its policy of nonalignment. However,
Yugoslavia could very easily have turned completely to the
West and even become a member of NATO. Indeed, there were
tendencies in that very direction. In order to understand
why Yugoslavia turned to an active policy of nonalignment
instead, one must understand the nature of the Yugoslav
leadership and the background of the historic break with
the Soviet Union.
Spurred by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution
in Russia, various socialist organizations convened in
Belgrade on April 19 » 1919 and lormed tne Socialist viiorxers
Party of Yugoslavia (Communist). In the election of 1920,
the new party won 58 seats out of 419 in Constituent
Assembly. It was the third largest party at the time. How-
ever, its greatest success came in Montenegro and Macedonia,
5tne most backward regions of the new state. After several
unsuccessful attempts at violence and tne successful assas—
ination of the Interior Minister, Milorad Draskovic, the
new Party was outlawed in August of 1921.
The Party fall into an eclipse for several reasons
other than its illegal status. One reason was the extreme
fragmentation of the infant Party. The Second Party Congress
in Vukovar on June 15, 1920 did much to cause this fragmen-
tation. At this Congress, the Party changed its name to
that of tne Communist Party of Yugoslavia and adopted a
policy of complete submission to the Comintern, tne inter-
national communist agency. A small group of independents
rebelled at this and wanted autonomy for every member of
the Third Internat ional. This small group was purged for
its effort, but its ideas were to see success twenty-eight
years later.
The other cause of the Party's factionalism was, as
always in Yugoslavia, the nationality question. The Comin-
tern leaders and Stalin himself felt that the ethnic antag-
onisms should be exploited by tne Party for the sa ;e of the
eventual revolution. The leader of the Yugoslav Party at
this time was one Sima Markovich, alias Seuiich. tie was un-
willing to grant the right of secession to non-Serb minor-
ities and felt that any such appeal was non-Marxist, tie felt
tnat the nationalities question was a constitutional one.
The Comintern stressed that although Semich was coj rect in
ohis interpretation of Marx, the nationality question was
one ox tactics and not ideology. Semich dared to put his
interpretation of Marx ahead of that of Moscow's. This
tneme will reappear in 1948.-*-
In 1928, the leader of the Zagreb branch of the CPY,
Josip Broz, later to be known as Tito, went over the heads
of the Yugoslav leadership and sent an appeal to tne Comin-
tern to take the Yugoslav Party in hand and to end this
factional strife. This letter was well received in Moscow
and at tne Pourth Congress of the GPY in Dresden in 1928,
the Third Internat ional did just that. Semich was forced
to resign and a new leadership was installed, headed by
Djuro Djakovich and including Tito. In addition, the tactics
of the Party were cnanged to take advantage of the ethnic
divisions in Yugoslavia. This tactic was dutifully followed
upon the Party's return to Yugoslavia. They tried to out-
bid nearly every extreme nationalist group in an attempt
to win followers. They called for the secession and indepen-
dence of nearly every ethnic minority in the country. These
attempts could only lead to failure and the Party's popu-
larity declined further. In 1932, a new leader, Milan aor-
kich, was chosen but the Party's decline continued, in 1936,
the entire Central Committee of the CPY was summoned to
^Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 1-14.
7Moscow and, as was the custom in Moscow at the time, purged
of its Incorrect members. In addition, the Party did an about
lace and proclaimed that ethnic separation was no longer
the policy of the Party. This no doubt reflected the Soviet
need ior potential allies in a possible conflict with
Hitler's Germany. In 1937, Tito was designated by Moscow
as tne new Secretary General.^
Tito must have appeared to be the ideal subservient
leader to the Russians at this time. Josip Broz was born
in the village of Kumrovec in Croatia on May 7, 1892. He
was apprenticed as a locksmith and received his certificate
in September of 1910 and joined the Metal Workers' Union
the following montn. He practiced his trade until his con-
scription in 1913 at tne age of twenty-one into the Austro-
Hungarian Army. During the subsequent war, Tito, an NCO,
was wounded and captured by tne Russians on March 25, 1913-
He spent the next five years roaming the Russian country-
side and waiting out the war in various Russian jails.
After being freed at the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion, he fought as a Red Guard for some time. He officially
joined tne Communist Party while in Omsk on January 19, 1919.
On the following January he married a Russian girl, Pelagea
Belousova, and returned home snortly thereafter. He began
active Party work in 1923 and soon found himself in prison
in 1928 after he wrote his letter to Moscow. He emerged
2ibid.
, pp. 14-22.
8from prison five years later and soon moved up in Party
rank. He was chosen Secretary General of tne Yugoslav
Party by the Russians because of nis close ties with Russia,
his demonstrated subservience to Moscow, and his proletarian,
non- intellectual background.
^
In tne period from 1937 to 19^1, tne CPY under Tito's
leadership laid the grounds for its eventual success.
Operating from within Yugoslavia, Tito and nis followers
built up an experienced, trained, and above all united
band of cadres. The new tactic of appealling to all Yugo-
slavs met with some success. Many intellectuals and others
were tired of tne incessant ethnic strife. The Party also
capitalized on the strong anti-Hitler feeling prevalent
in Yugoslavia. This appeal was of course limited by the
treaty between Germany and Russia in 1939. Tito did, however,
build up a personal following and installed his close sup-
porters such as Rdward Kardelj, Alex Rankovic, and Milovan
DJilas Into positions of power.
^
The advent of tne Gecond World War in Yugoslavia gave
Tito and the Communists the cnance they had been waiting
for. The Yugoslav government of Prince-Regent Paul signed
an agreement on March 25» 19^1 allowing tne Germans to
cross Yugoslavia on their way to Greece, ihe Yugoslav
3pnyllis Auty, Tito: A Biography (London: Longman
Group Limited, 1970), pp. 3-57.
^Ulam, Tit olsm t pp. 22-26.
9government was overthrown two days later by General Simovich
and King Peter was installed as the King in an anti-Nazi
regime • x he uermans invaded on April 6 and the new Jugo-
slav regime was quickly overrun. The country was governed
by Germany and Italy and various puppet states were created.
The attitude of the Communists was somewhat ambivalent un-
til the attack on Russia by Germany on June 21, 1941. The
Jugoslav Communists then became fierce defenders of their
"country".
5
The first resistance to the Germans was by the Chet-
niks, a para-military pro-Serbian organization under the
leadership of General Mihailovich. The Communists then
organized their resistance and took the name of Partisans.
The Communists played down ideology and accentuated Jugo-
slav nationalism. While remaining in control, the Communists
were willing to accept people of all political persuasions
into their anti-German movement. They were also willing
to accept people of all ethnic backgrounds. In contrast,
tne Chetniks were almost completely Serbian. Soon, three
overlapping wars were going on at once; a war of resistance
by both groups against tne Germans and their puppets, a
civil war between tne Chetniks and the partisans, and a
general blood bath between the Serbs and tne Croats that
had religious overtones. The Chetniks were either unable
or unwilling, because of atrocious German recriminat ions
^George Vf. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Jugoslavia
and the New Communism (New Jorkl Twentieth Centuiy ..uni,
1962), pp. 69-Sl.
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against the civilian population, to mount an effective
resistance. The Partisans were much more effective and
consequently increased in membership from 80, 000 in 1941
to 600,000 in 1944. Britain and the United States recog-
nized the royal government in exile but aided the Partisans
for military reasons, lhe British ware the first to aid the
Partisans in May of 1943. in contrast, the Russians didn't
send aid until February of 1944. The Russians feared alien-
ating the allies. The Red Army entered Yugoslavia in the
Fall of 1944 with an agreement to leave as soon as possible.
On October 20, 1944 the Partisans and the Red Army liberated
Belgrade and the irfar was over for Yugoslavia.^
During the Jar, the Communists remained in control
of the Partisan movement through the device of various
front organizations. In November of 1942, they created the
Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia
or AVNOJ
.
in 1943 a National Liberation Committee was est-
ablished as a provisional government in Partisan controlled
areas. Tito was of course President, but the Committee con-
tained a few non- Communist s as well, in June of 1944, Pre-
mier Subasic of tne Royal Government signed an agreement
with Tito. The subsequent elections were single slate
elections organized by the Communist dominated Popular
Front. As a result, the Popular Front received 90.8 per
cent of tne vote. A Constitutional Assembly met on November
29, 1945 and denounced the monarchy and proclaimed tne
°ibid
.
,
pp. 69-81
11
People's Republic of Yugoslavia. A new Stalinist Constit-
ution was put into effect on January 50, 1946.
?
The Partisans succeeded because of their better organ-
ization and the higher quality of their political and mil-
itary leadership. Also, the unique conditions in Yugoslavia
allowed them to wage a war against occupation and a domes-
tic revolution at the same time.
There were many factors that promoted and continue
to promote a close relationship between Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union. First and foremost is the fact that they are
both communist states dominated by their respective commun-
ist parties. This meant, at least before 1948, the domin-
ation of the CPSU by difinition. One of Stalin's main con-
tributions to Marxist theory was the idea of "socialism in
one country. " This meant that the main function of the
international communist movement is the perpetuation and
strengthening of the only successful socialist revolution,
that of the Soviet Union. Any divergence from this view
was looked on as petty bourgeois nationalism. Thus Kardelj
could say in 1945 that he wanted the "Soviet Union to look
at us as one of the future Soviet Republics, and not as
representatives of another country, capable of independent-
ly solving questions."®
7 ibid.
, pp. 69-81.
®Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and
Conflict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 39.
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la have seen that the actual organization of the
Yugoslav Communist Party was determined by the Soviet lead-
ers. As early as the Fourth Party Congress in 1928, the
CPY was completely under the influence of the Third Inter-
national led by the Soviet Jnion* The Yugoslav Party duti-
fully followed every twist and turn in tactics and strategy
as dictated by the Soviet Union. Tito, Kardelj, and others
had spent considerable time in the Soviet Union. Also, at
least before the War, Tito and others owed their position
in the Party to the support of the CPSU.
Yugoslav relations had gotten progressively worse
with the West. This was because of their Marxist domestic
programs and their militancy in foreign affairs. In 1946,
they shot down two United States' planes flying over their
territory. They were giving much support to tne Greek Com-
munists in their Civil War. They were at odds with the West
on the question of Trieste. In view of these difficulties,
the Yugoslavs looked upon tne Soviets as their protector
in case of an invasion by the West.
Still, the greatest tie between the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia was their mutual devotion to the principles of
Marxist-Leninism. As Djilas puts it, ’'For the Yugoslavs,
Moscow was not only a political and spiritual center but
the realization of an abstract ideal-the ' classless society'
something that not only made their sacrifice and suffering
easy and sweet, but that justified their very existence in
13
their own eyes. "9 This feeling extended to the Soviet lead-
ership as well. "The Yugoslav Communist Party was not only
as ideologically unified as the Soviet, but faithfulness
to Soviet leadership was one of tne essential elements of
its development and activity. Stalin was not only the un-
disputed leader of genius, he was the incarnation of the
very idea and dream of the new society." 10 The Yugoslavs
and o.ther Bast Buropean Communists were so committed to the
idea of communism that the Soviet Union became perfect in
their eyes. The idea that Russian national interest and
Yugoslav national interest might differ on occasion was
simply impossible.
Less important, but still a factor was the historic
tie between Yugoslavs and Russians as Slavic people. The
Russians, as Orthodox Christians, ohad long been a protector
of the Orthodox Christians of Serbia and Montenegro. The
Russian defeat of Turkey in 1878 gave Serbia her full in-
dependence. The Yugoslav Communists, although admitting to
exploiting Slavic solidarity, realized that Marxist-Leninism
was the all important idea. During the Second World War,
Moscow created a Pan Slavic Committee to tie tne Slavic
people together. Djilas describes this as a "matter of
resurrecting something long since outmoded, a transitional
^Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin (New forx.
Harcourt, Brace, & World"] Inc . , 1902) , p. 11.
10 Ibid., p. 14.
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form meant to rally support around Communist Russia, or at
least to paralyze anti-Soviet Panslavic currents."*^
Another factor holding Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union
together were the economic ties forged between the two count-
ries after the War. By 1947, the Soviet Union and its sat-
ellites provided Yugoslavia with 51.8 per cent of its im-
ported goods and in turn received 49.1 per cent of Yugoslav
exports, however, this was somewhat artificial as post-48
events were to show. In fact, before 1938 66 per cent of
Yugoslav trade was with the West. Due to geographic and
economic factors, Yugoslavia's natural trade outlets are
to Italy, West Germany
,
and Western Europe as a whole. How-
ever, Yugoslavia does have an interest in keeping trade
12ties with the countries of East Europe and the Soviet Union.
Yugoslavia was expelled from the international Commun-
ist movement by a communique from the Cominform on June
28, 194-8. This action caught the West by almost complete
surprise but it had really been building since the beginning
of txie year and, in fact, had its roots in the very nature
of the Yugoslav Communist movement.
Dallas had left for Moscow on January 8, 1948 to set-
tle differences between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on
the question of Albania. At their meeting, Stalin said tnat
Hlbid.
,
p. 25.
George Eaminovich, The Development of Socialist
Yugoslavia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 19o8),
pp. 6o-66.
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it was all right if Yugoslavia 'swallowed' Albania. Through-
out the meeting, it was apparent to Djilas that he was being
recruited by the Soviets against Tito. As Dallas waited in
Moscow, the Soviets sent for Tito. Wisely, he sent KardelJ
and Balearic in his place. At a meeting on February 10, 1948
with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations, the Soviets
charged the Yugoslavs with several errors. These included:
the sending of two Yugoslav divisions into Albania, the
signing of a trade agreement with Bulgaria, and non-cooper-
ation with Soviet military and economic officials. The crux
of tne matter was that the Yugoslavs were not consulting
with Moscow before making decisions. At one point Stalin
screamed at Kardelj, MYou don’t consult at all, that is
not your mistake, but your policy-yes, your policy!* 1 ^ At
the close of the meeting, Stalin ordered an immediate fed-
eration between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
After the return of the Yugoslav delegation, the
Central Committee of the CPY met and opposed a federation
with Bulgaria. This was reported to the Soviets by S.
^hujovich, a member of the Central Committee. The Soviets
then withdrew their military and economic advisors on March
18th and 19th- respectively. A series of correspondence,
since made public, then followed. The Yugoslavs, in a let-
ter dated March 20, denied that Soviet advisors were ” sur-
rounded by a sea of hostility
1
’ as had been claimed Dj the
-^Djilas, Conversations With Stalin , p. loO.
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Soviets, iito did state that Soviet officials should go to
the Central Committee of the CPI for information and not
^ ^ leaser ol I icials. iito states that the Soviets have been
misinformed and ends with a desire to resolve all differ-
ences.
In a reply on March 27, the Soviets raised the level
of their criticism. They said that the Soviet advisors had
been repeatedly abused and spied upon in Yugoslavia. They
also brought up the old statement attributed to Djilas at
a Central Committee meeting in 194-5* He reportedly said
that Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, in-
ferior to the officers of the British army. This state-
ment had been repeatedly denied before, but it does show
that there was widespread Yugoslav protests over Soviet
behavior during the War, specifically 121 documented rapes.
The Soviets also complained about certain slanders of tne
Soviet Union reportedly made by leading Yugoslav Commun-
ists. The naughty attitude of the Soviets can be demon-
strated by this statement, "it was naturally laughable to
hear such statements about the CPSU from such questionable
„14
Marxists as Dallas, Vukmanovic, Kidric, R&nkovic and others.
These slanders were compared to those made by Trotsky at
an earlier date. A further criticism was that the CPY lacked
internal democracy and that the CPY was not organized along
Marxist-Leninist principles. The Soviets also felt that the
l4dobert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, ads., Tne Soviet-.
Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record (New
York: Prospect Books, 1959T, p7l04
17
class struggle was not being intensified in the country-
side and this was reminiscent of the "right opposition" of
Bukharin. The letter ended with the charge that the Assis-
tant Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, Velebit, was an Eng-
lish spy. Accordingly, the Soviet Union felt disposed to
limit its correspondence with Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslavs replied on April 13, 1948. They were
still conciliatory. They denied slandering the Soviet Union
and that there was indeed democracy in the CPY. However,
the Yugoslavs than went a step furtner by saying that the
Soviet Ambassador, Lavrentiev, had no special right to in-
formation about the CPY. In response to the criticism of
internal conditions in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs made a
statement that had many ramifications for Yugoslavia and
communism as a whole. They said, "On the contrary, we study
and take as an example the Soviet system, but we are devel-
oping Socialism in our country in somewhat different forms.
The Yugoslavs did complain about the Soviet practice of re-
cruiting citizens of Yugoslavia as Soviet agents. The letter
ends with an invitation to the Central Committee of the 0P3U
to send one or more representatives to Yugoslavia to iron
out tneir differences.
The Soviets replied on May 4 and denied any espionage
activities in Yugoslavia. The letter reiterated the main
charges against Yugoslavia. The Soviets toox exception to
15Ibid.
,
p. 20.
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I'ito's statement that the activities of tne CPY were of no
special concern to the Soviet Ambassador. They said this
statement was anti-Soviet and equated the Soviet Ambassa-
dor with those of Western imperialist states. The Jugoslav
leadership was accused of arrogance and failure to respond
to criticism. The good relations the Soviet Union main-
tained with the other People's Democracies of Eastern Europe
were contrasted with the poor relations between Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union. The letter also reveals that the dis-
pute had been disclosed to the CP's of the Cominform countries
and that it would be discussed at the forthcoming Cominform
meeting.
In two subsequent letters on May 17 and 20, the Yugo-
slavs refused to attend the upcoming Cominform meeting.
Tne Soviets in turn charged that the Yugoslavs evidently
considered themselves above the authority of the Cominform.
The Soviets regarded this decision as evidence of their
guilt.
The Cominform Resolution of June 28, 1948 in effect
ousts tne CPY from the united communist front and the Com-
inform. The Resolution summarizes the charges made previous-
ly by the Soviet Union. They may be stated as follows:
1. A deviationist domestic and foreign policy;
2. Determined hostility toward the Soviet Union;
3. A faulty agricultural policy;
4. A non-Marxist-Leninist conception of the role of the
party;
5. Refusal to accept criticism;
19
6. Arrogant behavior toward fraternal parties and claims
to privilege. lo
Tne Resolution ends with a frank call to the Yugoslav rank
and file to overthrow their leadersnip.
In addition to these public grievances, there were
otner sources of disagreement between the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. One of the chief points of disagreement was
the Soviet intention of exploiting the Yugoslav economy.
As in other East European countries, the Soviets sought to
establish Joint stock companies with the Yugoslavs. The
basic Soviet intention was to keep Yugoslavia an agricul-
tural and raw materials producing country. In contrast to
other East European countries, only two Joint stock com-
panies were set up in Yugoslavia. These were JUSTA, in
civil aviation, and JUSPAQ, in shipping. Through a variety
of devices the Soviets clearly dominated these Joint stock
companies to the disadvantage of the Yugoslavs. For example,
the Soviets overestimated their share by using 1946-47
prices for estimating their stock. These prices were very
high compared to the 1938 prices which the Yugoslav stock
was estimated at. The Soviets then didn't have to invest
as much as the Yugoslavs. In addition, the Director Gen-
eral of these Joint companies had always to be a Soviet
citizen. The Yugoslavs naturally objected to these companies
and to the prospect of future ones. The last straw was a
lo Ibld.
, p. 40.
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Soviet proposal for a joint national bank which would have
put the Soviets in control of a significant part of Yugo-
slav trade. When the Yugoslavs objected, the Soviets re-
garded this as an hostile act. The significant fact is that
the Yugoslavs were able to avoid more exploitation only
because they had acnieved their revolution by themselves.
The otner East European countries had no such protection
and were exploited to a far greater degree. 17
There were many foreign policy disputed between the
two communist states also. We have already spoken of the
Soviet disagreement with the Yugoslavs over their activity
in Albania. In addition, the Yugoslavs actively supported
the Greek Communists in their civil war but were told to
stop by Stalin in 1948. More important for the Yugoslavs
was the Soviet refusal to support them in their bid for
the city of Trieste. The Soviets apparently bowed to allied
pressure and agreed that Trieste should be part of Italy.
The Soviet charges and the Yugoslav countercharges
were symptoms of a deeper problem inherent in Yugoslav-
Soviet relations. The fundamental reason for the split was
that the Yugoslavs, unlike any other Communist country of
.Eastern Europe, excluding Albania, gained power and carried
out a revolution largely without the aid of the Soviet
Union and specifically the Ned Army. The Soviet Union
17Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost (New forx.
The Viking Press, 1971) » pp. 73-97.
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refused to recognize the nature of the Jugoslav Revolution
and treated Yugoslavia as a People's Democracy siinlliar to
other East European countries. The Yugoslavs saw themselves
as a genuine communist regime and far ahead of the other
East European countries. It was this fundamental contradic-
tion that caused the Yugoslav break with the Soviet Union.
On a personal level, of course, this meant that the Yugo-
slav leadership owed their positions of power to their own
efforts in Yugoslavia and not to the Red Array. The question
was simply who was going to control Yugoslavia, the Yugo-
slavs or the Russian. 1^
The problem was not that the Yugoslavs were not Marx-
ist as charged by the Soviets. If anything, reminiscent of
Seinlch, the Yugoslavs followed a more Stalinist and Marxist
policy than any other East European country. The policy of
a different path to socialism is quite consistent with
Leninism. Politically, the Yugoslavs consolidated their
position much earlier than other East European countries.
General Mihailovic, the Ohetnik leader, was executed on
July 17, 1946. On October 11, 1946 Archbishop Stepinac was
sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment. Communist Party
membership was increased from 140,000 in 1946 to 448,175
in 1948. in addition, tne Communist controled Popular i'ront
organization was increased to a membership of seven million
by 1948. Unlike other satellite countries in Eastern Europe,
^Brze zinski
,
The Soviet Bloc , pp. 37-40.
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the Yugoslavs unabashedly called themselves Oominunist. They
openly proclaimed themselves a "dictatorship of the prole-
tariot ' while the satellite states were known as People's
Democracies. Ihe satellite states made concessions to pro-
gressive elements and social democrats. The first Yugoslav
election in 194-5 was a single list election while other
Communist Parties in Eastern Europe had to form coalitions
and work behind front organizations. The new Yugoslav Con-
stitution of January 30, 1946 was modeled directly after
the 1936 Soviet Constitution even as to its federal struc-
ture . 19
.Economically, the Yugoslavs were well in advance of
the other East European countries as far as Marxism was
concerned. The economy was highly centralized right after
the War and economic planning was begun almost immediately.
The first five year plan was promulgated in 19^7 and called
for rapid industrialization on the Soviet model. Andrya
Hebrang, later purged as a Soviet spy, was in charge of
this first five year plan. The Soviets were quite critical
of this plan for being very unrealistic. They were correct.
Wildly optimistic, it failed miserably but was undoubtedly
Marxist. Forced collectivization of agriculture was carried
out right after the War with the predictable bad results.
For these economic and political reasons, the Yugoslavs
righteously felt on an equal footing with the Soviets as
^Hoffman and Neal, Yu ;oslavia and the hew Jommunls_m ,
pp. 81-113.
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iar as demonstrated devotion to Marxism was concerned, and
the failure of the Soviets to accept this objective change
in Jugoslav conditions was one of the prime reasons for
the resultant split.
The Soviet Union under Stalin failed to support rev-
olutions that were out of their direct control. This was
true for the Spanish Revolution, the Yugoslav Revolution,
and the Chinese Revolution. Stalin felt that the creation
of revolutionary centers outside the Soviet Union would
endanger Soviet supremacy in world communism, ie was right,
of course. Stalin subjected the views and policies of the
OBSU to those of his own. The CBSU was, by definition, the
leading force in the Soviet Union. By simple extension,
the leading force in the communist world had to be the
Soviet Union with the dictator Stalin at its head. In Djilas*
words, "He became himself the slave of the despotism, the
bureaucracy, the narrowness, and the servility that he im-
posed on his country." 20
20 Djilas, Conversations , p. 132
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CHAPTER 11
THE UNCERTAIN YEARS
For a period of time, the Yugoslavs acted as if their
ouster from the Cominform was a minor quarrel and merely a
case of misunderstanding. It is important to remember that
basically the Yugoslavs did not break away from the Soviet
bloc, but were cast away over their protests. This excommun-
ication dealt a severe psychological and spiritual blow to
tne Party membership. The Yugoslav leadership was either un-
willing or unable to realize tne extent of their excommun-
ication. Por example, at tne Pifth Party Congress on July
21, 194-8 Tito ended an eight hour speech with the words,
"Long live the Soviet Union, long live Stalin." In the follow-
ing January, Yugoslavia dutifully applied for membership in
the Council for Mutual Economic Aid and the Yugoslav leaders
seemed puzzled and hurt when rebuffed. However, by the summer
of 1949 in the face of increasingly strident denunciations,
border clashes, and an economic blockade, Tito moved to con-
solidate his position. All known Soviet sympatnizers were
arrested and question. Arrests were to number over 14,000
by the end of 1952. Actually, Stalin's denunciations probably
made Tito more popular at home than he had ever been as Yugo-
slav nationalism rose to his defence.*"
21Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Qonaanism ,
pp. 141-142.
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In the long run, Yugoslavia maintained its indepen-
dence from the Soviet Union because of three factors: econ-
omic and military aid from the West, economic and political
reiorms at home, and a new constructive foreign policy.
Once trie Yugoslavs got over their initial shock;, they
realized their situation was very precarious. Their economy
suifered badly from the econoaiic blockade imposed by the Oom-
inform. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had supplied over
55 per cent of Yugoslavia's trade and the credit and loans
necessary to implement the five year plan. Reluctantly, the
Yugoslavs scrapped the plan which would not have succeeded
in any case. The Yugoslavs now turned to the West for aid.
In November 194-8, Yugoslavia applied for aid from the United
Nations. By 1950, Yugoslavia had received loans and credits
from the World Bank (#8 million), the Export- Import Bank
(#25 million), and the British treasury (#8 million). In
1950, the United States released some #47 million worth of
Yugoslav gold reserves it had been holding since the war.
in December 1950, through the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act,
the United States provided some #50 million worth of food
supplies to the beleaguered Yugoslavs. During the following
ten years, Yugoslavia received from the United States
#2,396,900,000 in aid of various kinds for economic and
military assistance. Britain supplied ^120,400,000 also.
Tnis aid allowed Yugoslavia to continue to exist and more
22
important, it precipitated a series oi economic reforms.
22Phyllis Auty, "Yugoslavia's International Relations,"
in Contemporary Yugoslavia , ed. by Wayne S. 7ucinich (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969) , PP» 167-172.
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Seeing that collaboration with the West did not harm
them, the Yugoslavs took a harder look at the Soviet model
oi development. The chief weaknesses of the Soviet system
seemed to be overcentralization and a stifling bureaucracy.
Accordingly, they reversed these trends in Yugoslavia. Local
Workers’ Councils were established in July of 1950 in order
to decentralize the economic structure. Similiarly, forced
collectivization was abandoned in March of 1953. These re-
forms have continued until today Yugoslavia makes much use
of the market principle while retaining a loosely controlled
central plan, 2^
In the political realm, the Party cnanged its name to
that of the League of Yugoslav Communists in 1932 at the
Sixth Party Congress. The name signifies a higher state of
development for the Party. While remaining a one party state,
tnere has been an increase in internal party democracy.
There has also been an increase in civil liberties, the case
of Djilas notwithstanding. Yugoslavia has striven for greater
participation in political life of the country by a law pro-
hibiting succession to the same office.
However, what concerns us here is the impact on Yugo-
slav foreign policy. The break with the Soviet Union and
the extension of Western aid with little or no strings
attached caused Yugoslavia to rethink her foreign policy
as well as her economic policy. The Yugoslavs stall regarded
2
^Zaminovich, The Development of Yugoslavia , pp. 7 3-91.
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the West with their old doctrinaire hostility and suspicion.
However, an important fact pushing Yugoslavia toward the West
was the actions of the Soviet Union and the satellite states,
in 1949 and 1950 the Soviet bloc conducted military exer-
cises and massed troops on Yugoslavia's border. These moves
were threatening in themselves but then came the North Korean
attack on South Korea in June of 1950. This attack, the Yugo-
slavs reasoned, could only have occurred with Soviet concur-
rence if not pressure. Did this signal a similiar attack on
Yugoslavia by the Soviet bloc? Many observors both in Yugo-
slavia and the West thought so, even though Yugoslavia had
Europe's largest army behind the Soviet Union with 350,000
men comprising 32 divisions. Accordingly, they made arrange-
ments with the United States for military supplies and train-
ing. However, military aid from the United States did not
come as easily as economic aid. Military aid required the
signing of a bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Program and
the acceptance of a United States Military Assistance Advis-
ory uroup in Yugoslavia. This was done after relatively easy
negotiations and military aid began on a formal basis on
November 14, 1951. Over the next ten years military aid was
to total #693, 900,000.
24
Whether or not the Soviet Union conte nplated an armed
attack against Yugoslavia is not known. Surely it must have
^John 0. Campbell, Tito's Separate Hoad (New York:
Harper & Roe, 1967), PP« 22-27.
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crossed Stalin’s mind. Stalin's own egoism seems 10 be one
of tne reasons that Yugoslavia was not attacked. Stalin felt
that only a word from aim would be enough to topple Tito,
Khrushchev, in his secret speecn in 1956 at the Twentieth
Party Congress, reported Stalin as saying, "i will shake my
little finger-and there will be no more Tito. lie will fall. "^6
By the time Stalin realized this would not happen, Tito had
consolidated his position at home and had received military
aid from the West. Stalin was not about to risk a major war
with the West over Yugoslavia. In either case, the apparent
turn to the West by Tito was his greatest sin and proof of
his earlier guilt. In Stalin's circular logic it confirmed
that Tito and his renegade clique were in fact agents of
imperialism.
One such traitorous act by the Yugoslavs was the sign-
of a Treaty of friendship and Cooperation with Jreece and
Turkey at Ankara on February 28, 1953. This seemingly pre-
saged a definite move to the West by Yugoslavia. Many West-
ern observors rather naively expected Yugoslavia to become
a member of NATO as her partners in the Balkan Pact, dreece
and Turkey, had in September of 1951. Indeed, such a move
did seem plausible at this time considering the hostile
actions of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, act lally
however, the signing of the Balkan Pact was the closest Tito
2
^Nixita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers , translated
and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1970), p. 377.
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was to come to NATO and, in fact, the Treaty itself was one
of the reasons Tito did not have to Join NATO.
The Balkan Bact nad a short life span and was born only-
after international events had made it possible. Relations
between J-reece and Yugoslavia were not good in trie immed-
iate post World War 11 years. There were two basic reasons
for this. One of these was the active and open support given
to the Greek communist guerrillas by tne Yugoslavs. This
aid included training centers in Yugoslavia, weapons and
supplies, hospital facilities, and permission to cross into
Yugoslavia when pursued by the Greek national army. This aid
naturally did not foster cordial relations with the Greek
government engaged In a death struggle with the communist
insurgents. As has been disclosed, Stalin told the Yugoslavs
in February of 1948 to cease aiding tne Greek communists,
however, active aid continued untill the spring of 194-9 al-
most a year after the break with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet- Yugoslavia break left the Greek communists
in an ambiguous position. They wanted to continue to be close
to tne Soviet Union and tne Cominform, but at tne same time
continue their close relations with Yugoslavia from whom
tney received most of their aid. This theoretical problem
soon came to be a power straggle between General Markos,
wno favored continued collaboration with Yugoslavia, and
Secretary gahariades, who took the position of the Oominfor m.
26John 0. la t rides, Balkan Triangle (The Hague:
mouton, 1968), pp. 56-57.
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fian^riades faction won and General Markos was relieved of
tiis post in tne winter of 194-8. In a series of bitter accu-
sations in the spring of 1949, the KK.fi leaders accused the
Jugoslavs of sabotaging tneir movement. Apparently the KKfi
leaders were unaware that their Great leather, Stalin, had
abandoned them in February of 1948, more than a year earlier,
lito replied almost immediately accusing the KKS leadership
of blindly following the Oominform line and jeopardizing the
revolution in Greece. ’Ihis exchange and tne closing of the
border in August of 1949 marked the end of Yugoslavia's
27
support of the Greek communists.
The remaining obstacle to better relations between
Greece and Yugoslavia was the perennial question of Macedonia.
The Macedonian people inhabit an area overlapping three
countries; Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The area and
people have long been a source of discord between all three
countries, rthile Tito was still aiding the Greek communists,
he envisioned a Macedonian Republic to be joined with a
Bulgarian Republic as parts of an enlarged Yugoslavia. The
break with the Soviet Union and the failure of the Greek
communist revolt put an end to this grandiose vision. How-
ever, Tito did not abandon his claims to Greek Macedonia.
In statements during tne summer of 1950, the Yugoslavs
claimed that the Macedonian minority living in Greece was
being persecuted and that the Belgrade government lelt
2
^Ibld.
, pp. 59-60.
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obligated to protact '’Yugoslavs’' living in Greece. The Greek
government replied that as far as Greece was concerned no
sucn minorities question existed. Greek- Yugoslav relations
were virtually at an impasse.
However, international events in the summer of 1950
prompted a new thaw in Greek- Yugoslav relations, foremost
of tnese events was the outbreak of the korean tfar in June.
This was accompanied by serious incidents along tne Yugoslav-
Bulgarian border. It seemed to many observors that a military
offensive was being prepared against the Balkans. Accordingly,
the dispute over Macedonia was toned down if not completely
forgotten, A lar0 e number of Greek prisoners and chxldren
were released by the Yugoslavs on November 6, 1950. This was
followed by a series of visits by political leaders and mil-
itary men between the two countries. Questions of joint de-
fense were tne main reason for the talks. In September of
1952 General Bavle Jaksic of Yugoslavia headed a team of
officers visiting Greece. There, a general agreement in prin-
ciple was reached that in tne event of communist aggression
in the Balkans tne military forces of tne two countries
would cooperate in matters of defense. The Yugoslavs were
unwilling to enter into a more formal agreement as the Greeks
pQ
would have liked. t~
Relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey were cool for
various reasons. Serbia had been part oi the oppressive
28 lbid.
, PP* ^9-74.
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Ottoman Empire for centuries before winning full indepen-
dence in IcifB. Post world Uar 11 relations were no better.
Turkey was staunchly anti- communist while Yugoslavia was
the spearhead of communism in the Balkans. A more specific
source of discord was Yugoslav mistreatment and persecution
of the Muslim minority in Yugoslavia, however, the same
forces which caused relations with ireece to improve, that
is: the Korean tfar, the soviet ization of the socialist
countries of Eastern Europe, and the military threat from
tne Soviet Union, soon produced a thaw in Yugoslav-Turk re-
lations. An important step was taken in January of 1950
when Yugoslavia agreed to compensate Turks whose property
had been lost in Yugoslavia as a result of nationalization.
In September of 1952 the same military team which had visited
Greece earlier in tne month visited Ankara. A few months
later Tito declared that Turkey would be included in any
agreement on Yugoslavia's defense because "aggression is
not limited by geography and tnere can be no neutrality in
the world." Thus, Turkey as well as Greece seemed to be
ready to join Yugoslavia in a defense agreement by the end
of 1952. 29
A final and important factor in the development of a
Balkan Treaty was pressure from tne allies and especially
the United States. One such figure in this eiiort was tne
American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George Allen. Uhen American
2
^lbid.
,
pp. 81-86.
33
<a.xd began ilowing into Yugoslavia in 1951, Ambassador Allen
requested that American aid to Yugoslavia be shipped tnrough
the Ureek port of Thessalonixi. Otherwise, Allen threatened,
American aid may be stopped. The Yugoslavs of course agreed.
Tnrough this and sxmiliar measures, the Americans encouraged
a reconciliation between the three countries. During June
and July of 1952 American Under Secretary of Defense frank
0. Nash visited the three countries. This was followed in
August by a visit to Belgrade by American Secretary of the
Army frank Pace. British foreign Secretary Anthony Sden
visited Belgrade in September. These three visits and the
continued American presence in Yugoslavia undoubtedly en-
couraged a tripartite defense pact.^0
Tito still had torave reservations about a formal pact
and wanted only an ad hoc informal agreement. There were
several reasons for this feeling, first, Tito was still a
marxist-Leninist and suspicious of tne vfest as were the
rank and file party members. He could hot ignore the poss-
ibility that any such overt move to tne »fest might incite
a revolt among his more Moscow oriented followers. Also,
he did not want to be tied to any one sxde after his exper-
ience with Stalin and the Oominform. in addition, Tito had
to consider the possibility that a formal pact with two
NATO members might be interpreted by the Soviet bloc as a
hostile act and might actually provoke a Soviet strike
3°Ibid.
, pp, 95-96.
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against Jugoslavia. Also, Yugoslavia and Italy still had a
serious dispute over Trieste and tnis remained a sore spot
between Yugoslavia and a stronger association with the West.
The question of Trieste was a complicated and serious
obstacle to better relations between Yugoslavia and Italy
and, by extension, tne West. Briefly, the issue of Trieste
arose after the War when Yugoslavia occupied a Zone B while
a Zone A was under Anglo-American occupation, in 1948 the
allies decided to return both zones to Italy much to Yugo-
slavia's outrage. However, this was not done. Concerning
tne Balkan Pact, Italy was not against a pact as such but
felt the Trieste issue should be settled first. In 1932,
tne allies turned over administrat ion of Zone A to Italy
without consulting Belgrade. This enraged Tito and troops
were sent to tne border. The allies cancelled their deci-
sion but after tnis Tito used the possibility of a Balkan
Pact as leverage with the West for a Yugoslav solution to
the Trieste dispute. Pearing growing Italian influence in
the Balkans and tne continued pressure from the West, Tito
changed his mind and called for a formal agreement with
Creece and Turkey. He made this public in a speech in De-
cember of 1952.
in November of 1952 the Central Committee of the CPY
and the Yugoslav National Assembly approved resolutions
^Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism,
pp. 420-421.
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calling tor common defense measures with. Greece and Turkey.
This was followed by reciprocal visits of the three Foreign
Ministers in January and February of 1953. After some spir-
ited negotiations, it was agreed to sign a political agree-
ment and hope for a military pact in the future. Both dreece
and Turkey felt that Yugoslavia would soon Join NATO, and
in such a case a tripartite military agreement would not be
necessary, in any case, the Treaty of Friendship and Collab-
oration was signed at Ankara by the three Foreign Ministers
on February 28, 1953 and became effective on May 29 when
the instruments of ratification were exchanged.
Although a political agreement, the treaty puts great
emphasis on matters of security. The signatories commit them-
selves to consult and cooperate on matters concerning common
defense. It is specified that strictly internal developments
such as changes of government are not the province of the
treaty. In addition, it specifies in Article 8 that the
rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey under the NATO
treaty are not to be affected by this accord. The treaty
calls for increased cooperation in economic, technical, and
cultural affairs. The treaty is declared open to other states
provided their membership is deemed beneficial by all three
parties .
^
The relationship between the treaty countries and NATO
•^Iatrides, Balkan Triangle , pp. 94-104.
^"Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between ureece,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia,” in latrides, Balkan T riangle, pp. 187-18?
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was a very important one. The treaty called for frank con-
sultations and mutual defense planning between the three
countries. Although the treaty stated that it did not affect
Gree* and Turkish obligations under NATO
,
frank consultations
meant that overall NATO defense planning for the Balkans was
made known to the Yugoslavs. In addition, in the event of
an attack on Yugoslavia, any Areek or Turkish assistance
could only be undertaken after consultations with NATO head-
quarters. However, there was little doubt that NATO head-
quarters would approve Ureek and Turkish assistance if tnose
two countries deemed it necessary. This in turn would Involve
NATO. As latrides states, “Only in a narrow legal sense
could it be said tnat NATO was in no way responsible for
the security of the entire Balkan group. "3^ Therefore, for
all practical purposes Tito had placed himself under tne
blanket of NATO protection without actually joining the
western bloc. Such a position left open a rapprochement
with the Soviet Union and allowed the continued support of
even the staunchest Marxists in the Yugoslav Party. Although
Sreece and Turkey and many others felt this treaty presaged
Yugoslavia's joining of NATO, this was the closest Tito was
to come to joining tne Western bloc.
Throughout tne summer of 1953 military talks continued
although Yugoslavia steadfastly refused to enter into a mil-
itary pact or to join NATO. This feeling changed mainly as
3^iatrides, Balkan Triangle , p. 10o
37
a result of some poorly timed actions by the tfest concerning
Trieste. in October of 1933 Britain and the United States
announced that they were turning over <Sone A entirely to
Italy and withdrawing their troops from Irieste. This announce-
ment was again made without any consultation with Belgrade.
This brought forth a strong reaction from Tito. He denounced
the Western powers and Italy and moved troops to the fron-
tier. The issue remained tense throughout the year and was
further complicated by tne improvement in relations between
Italy and Yugoslavia's partners in the treaty. This fact,
combined with the easing of tensions with the Soviet Union
made possible by the death of Stalin in March of 1953» in-
dicated that Tito entered into the military alliance of 1954
as a move for greater diplomatic leverage against Italy.
Tne Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance was signed at Bled, Yugoslavia on August
9, 1954. This took place only after long negotiations com-
plicated by tne issue of Trieste and the relationship of
the treaty to NATO. Article 2 of the treaty states that an
armed attack on one will be regarded as an attack on all.
After such an aggression, tne tnree countries would immed-
iately undertake mutual consnltat ions to determine a course
of action. Thus, the treaty does not call for automatic
military action should an attack occur. It is stated that
35[ioffman and Neal, Yu ;osIavia and tne few .jomuanism,
pp. 420-425.
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Yugoslavia is not required to take military action should
Greece and Turkey be drawn into a conflict through their NATO
obligations. The treaty again contains the provision that
v^reek and Turkish rights and obligations under NATO are not
aiiected by the treaty. Several Articles pledge to conform
to the United Nations Charter and to inform that body of
any action taken. The treaty calls for the creation of a
Permanent Secretariat through which the three countries will
coordinate their activities.^0
Actually, coming wnen it did, the Treaty of Bled was
practically stillborn. Immediately after the signing of the
treaty, the three Foreign Ministers played down the military
aspects of the pact. The Secretariat failed to meet after
the fall of 1955 and various other tasks were left undone.
Tne real death blow for the treaty was the outbreak of the
Cyprus crisis between Greece and Turkey in September 1955.
For Jugoslavia, the beginning of the end of the Balkan Pact
was the easing of tensions with the Soviet Union made poss-
ible by the death of Stalin in March 1953. However, the two
Balkan treaties did strengthen Yugoslavia's hand in dealing
with both the Bast and the West. This period was a very crit-
ical period for Yugoslavia and Tito steered through it un-
scathed and uncompromised. As iatrides states, "For tne Bel-
grade regime the Balkan Pact was a temporary and ideological
36 "Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance," in iatrides, Balkan Triangle , pp. 169-193.
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cumbersome accommodation, to be sought and cultivated only
as long as the Communist camp remained hostile toward Yugo-
slavia's ruling elite."37
Another reason for the demise of the Balkan Pact was
that Yugoslav foreign policy had taken on an increasingly
internationalist character. Yugoslav experience in the
United Nations in the early 50' s was one of the reasons for
this change. In the immediate post war years Yugoslavia duti-
fully followed the Soviet line on every issue brought before
tne United Nations. This policy even continued after the
June 1948 break for a short time. Por example, in 1949 Yugo-
slavia favored tne admission of Romania, Hungary, and Bul-
garia even though these countries were violently anti-lito
at the time. Yugoslavia recognized the People's Republic of
China in 1949 and supported its right to a seat on the Secur-
ity Council. However, this adnerence to the Soviet line
changed as the Yugoslavs realized tne seriousness oi the
rift with the Cominf orm.
In late 1949 the decision was made to bring the conflict
with the Soviet Union before the United Nations. In a speecn
before the United Nations on September 26 Sdward Kardelj,
the Yugoslav Minister of .Foreign Affairs, sharply criticized
the Soviet Union for interference in Yugoslav internal
37 latrides
,
Balkan Triangle , p. 182.
38Alvin g. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned
rtorld (Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1970),
pp. 151-135-
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<d-±. irs, inis was the xirst time the issue had. been aired
before the United Nations. Kardel^ charged the Soviet Union
with slander and lies, an economic blocitade, terrorist activ-
ities, and countless frontier incidents. This was of course
refuted by the Soviet foreign Minister, Andrei Vyshinsky.
A further dispute centered on Yugoslavia’s bid to fill a
non- permanent seat in the Security Council in 1949. The
Soviet Union tried to block the nomination be citing the
"gentlemen’ s agreement" to the effect that equal membership
be given on a basis of geographical distribution. Since
Yugoslavia was East Suropean, Slavic, and communist, the
Soviet position was seen to be one of simple hostility to
the Tito regime. Accordingly, the General Assembly on Octo-
ber 20, 1949 elected Yugoslavia on the second ballot to a
two year term on the Security Council. This was important
because it was during this period that Yugoslavia came into
prolonged contact wxth the new nations of Asia and Africa
and tne "seeds of nonalignment germinated. "^9
As a member of the Security Council, Yugoslavia was
in the forefront of negotiations over the outbreak of war
in Korea in June 1950. Yugoslavia supported the Uniting xor
Peace" Resolution which gave the leneral Assembly the power
to make recommendations for collective measures of sel^. de-
fense even if there is a lack of unanimity in the Security
Council. later however, the Yugoslav delegation disapproved
39lbld.
,
pp. 13-21
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of the decision to cross north of the thirty-eighth paral-
lel and upset the status quo existing before the outbreak
of war. Even now Yugoslavia was putting forward a nonaligned
position. During the debate on Korea at the United Nations
in September of 1950, KardelJ stated, "The peoples of Yugo-
slavia cannot accept the assumption that mankind must today
choose between the domination of one great power or another." 4 ^
The Yugoslav view of the newly independent nations of
' Africa and Asia changed perceptively during the early years
at the United Nations. Early impressions were of course con-
ditioned by the views of tne Soviet Union. Nehru of India
and Jinnan of Pakistan were denounced as agents of British
and American imperialism and Sukarno of Indonesia was labeled
a fascist for cooperating with the Japanese during world War
11. The independent position taken by India, Burma, and
S&ypl during the Korean War forced a reevaluation of the new
states. Of critical importance was tne cooperation among
India, Egypt
,
and Yugoslavia while all were members of the
Security Council in 1950-51* The three tended to agree on
most of the issues confronting them at this time, it was
apparent that there was room for a new approach to world prob-
lems outside of the two existing power blocs. As Rubinstein
states, "The United Nations became the Yugoslav bridge to
the Third World. "4 ^-
40 Ibid
.
,
p. 29.
4l Ibid.
,
p. 57.
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CHAPTER 111
THE THEORY OP NONALIGNMENT
The new approach to world problems envisioned by Yugo-
slavia and certain other states in the early 1950's came to
be known as tne policy of nonalignment
. Of course, tnis pol-
icy did not spring up overnignt but had a long and tortuous
history. Unfortunately, there has not evolved a body of co-
herent thought that one can unmistakenly label as nonalign-
ment. This nebulous character of the ideology, if it can be
called that, is caused in part by the wide diversity of the
nations professing a policy of nonalignment . These countries
adopted a policy of nonalignment for different reasons and
from different historical perspectives, We have seen that
the prime historical occurrence which induced Yugoslavia to
adopt a policy of nonalignment was tne break with the Soviet
Union in 1948. However, this would not have led to an inter-
national policy of nonalignment shared by many countries un-
less the international setting in general had favored the
adoption of such a policy by not only Yugoslavia but a wide
variety of nations.
The post World War 11 world was shaped by two develop-
ments wnich nave extreme importance in the formatxon of the
policy of nonalignment and to international relations in
general. These two political phenomena were the formation
^3
of the blocs and the disintegration of colonialism. The fact
tnat the temporary war time alliance between the United States
and the Soviet Union dissolved in the late 1940's is well
known and documented. A more interesting question is why
this split occurred. The accepted view is that the West and
principally tne United States reacted to Soviet military and
ideological threats directed toward Western Europe. A newer
and more questionable theory is that of the "revisionist"
historians of the West. Their position is tnat the United
States overreacted to ant i- communist hysteria and, by creat-
ing a military bloc, actually started the Oold War and fos-
tered tne emergence of the bipolar world in internat ional
relations, in either case the split led to the creation of
NATO and subsequently the Warsaw Pact, and this bipolar
structure reflected the actual balance of power in Europe
at this time.
This existing situation in terms of power was accom-
panied by ideologies on both sides justifying the creation
of military blocs. These ideologies sought to extend tne bi-
polar situation existing in Europe at this time to the rest
of the world, and it was partly as a response to this that
the concept of nonalignment was developed.
The Russian version of this ideology was the so called
"two camp" thesis associated with Ehdanov until his death
in 1948. The friendly relations between the West and tne
East in 1945 was only a temporary phenomenum. iarly
in 194o
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the Soviet line as enunciated by Stalin became increasingly
critical of the West, At tne twenty-ninth anniversary cele-
bration of the Bolshevik Revolution (November 7» 1946),
Andrei Ehdanov, the Leningrad Party Cnief, condemned the
Western attitude toward the Soviet Jnion and Eastern Europe.
He made a particular point to stress that the Eastern Euro-
pean countries should unite behind the leadership of the
Soviet (Jnion. This theme was repeated, again by Ehdanov,
at the formal inauguration of the Cominform in September of
1947 at Szklarska Poreba in Poland; where he accused the
United States of hostility to Eastern Europe and noted that
tne only consequence of this action was the division of the
world into two camps. The doctrine had become dominant by
the time of Tito's expulsion in 1948. 42
Tne response of the United States to the Soviet threat
in Europe is well known. The response took four political
forms: the Truman doctrine, containment, the Marshall Plan,
and the American alliance system. The creation of NATO in
I949 Was a pivotal point in this development but only one
of many alliances concluded by the United States during this
time. The Republican Administration in 1952 ushered in a new
policy of liberation. Secretary of State Dulles spoke in
terms of "rolling back the Iron Curtain." This policy was
demonstrated to be mere verbiage in 1956 but it did tighten
the bipolar nature of relations in Europe. The alliance
42Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc , pp. 41-64.
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system was extended globally by Dulles as he saw the threat
ox international monolithic communism everywhere. Dulles
viewed the incipient policy of nonalignment as basically im-
moral. His basic approach was that any nation not actively
aligned with the United States was, by definition, against
the United States. Thus, the ideologies of both super powers
condoned and actively pursued the two camp or two bloc struc-
ture of international relations at this time.
Nations such as Yugoslavia and new states such as
India felt this forced adherence to blocs threatened world
peace. They felt this led to a system of relations featur-
ing the rule that might is right and condoning interference
in the internal affairs of nations, bearing this and zeal-
ously guarding their independence, tnese and other states
resisted the overtures of tne two blocs. Also, the power
bloc rivalry inevitably led to an armament race with the
destructive potential for a conflict becoming even greater.
The principle of non-interference and the equality of nations
were not new ideas. These principles are embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations. As one Yugoslav scholar
states, ’'it is only as an anti-thesis to blocs that the
policy of non-alignment constitutes a new category in inter-
national relations. ,,z+ ^
The second major historical event bringing about the
policy of nonalignment was the disintegration of colonialism
^HanKo Peticovic, Non-alignment in the Contemporary
rtorld (Belgrade: Medunarodna Stampa-Interpress, 1968) , p • 5.
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and the birth of new states in Asia and Africa. The decline
of colonialism is a matter of common historical record. From
the beginning, many of these new states assumed a posture
of neutralism or noncommittment as it was variously called.
Some writers have attempted to distinquish between Asian
and African nonalignment and the nonalignment practiced by
Yugoslavia. Indeed, there are gradations of nonalignment as
practiced by various countries. In retrospect however, it
seems these differences reflected the personalities and
ideologies of the three principal leaders of nonalignment;
Nehru, Nasser, and Tito. Nehru personified the moral man of
peace; Nasser the fiery anti-colonialist; and Tito the de-
fender of independence between two mighty blocs. Although
these are only generalizations, they do reflect tne three
main strands of nonalignment.
Yugoslav writers often state that the advent of non-
alignment was inevitable given the historical forces prev-
alent at the time. This reflects the historical determinism
which characterizes Marxist thought. Other writers however,
state that the policy of nonalignment was assumed because
of very real conditions common to many countries at this
time
,
particularly the new states of Africa and Asia. An
Asian writer states that, ’’Nonalignment initially was a
method of determining free Asia's relations with the West."
44
44Sisir K. Gupta, "Asian Nonalignment
,
" in Politics
in Transitional Societies , ed. by Harvey I. Kebscnull
(New York: Applet on- Century- Orofts, 1968), p. 3o7
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while this may be true particularly for India, it fails to
account for the widespread acceptance of nonaligmnent by
widely divergent Asian and African states, and even one
European state. Professor Gecel Grabb has deduced four main
reasons for tne widespread adoption of nonalignmant
.
One of these reasons is what Grabb calls the "legacy
of colonialism." To the countries of Asia and Africa, the
term colonialism is applied almost exclusively to the West.
This is due to more than the historic fact that Western
European nations were the main colonizing states in the
past, iiuch to the dismay of the West, Third World observ-
ers do not consider the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe
eb colonialism. Por one thing, the states of Eastern Europe
are nominally independent and not completely subjugated as
the Afro-Asian colonies were. Also, the Soviet domination
of Eastern Europe lacks the racial factor which makes Western
colonialism such an explosive issue to former colonial
people.
Colonialism induces a policy of nonalignment in tne
Third World because it is considered a very real and con-
tinuing problem. This attitude may not accurately reflect
tne current situation but the acceptance of the threat of
"neo-colonialism" makes it very real nevertheless. Also,
the continued colonial holdings of Portugal gives the idea
added validity. PInally, nonalignment appeals to these
nations precisely because control over foreign policy was
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the last remnant of colonialism and perhaps the most bitter-
ly fought over. Bven after the granting of formal indepen-
dence, the colonial powers by various means, notably through
groups such as the British Commonwealth. Therefore, many
states adopted a policy of nonalignment as proof of their
independence from the former metropole.^
One may wonder how Jugoslavia fits into this frame-
work. Of course, Jugoslavia was not part of a Western colon-
ial empire and its acceptance of nonalignment must be con-
sidered somewhat of an aberration in this case. However,
from 194-5 to 1948 Jugoslavia was firmly within the Soviet
bloc. Although this doesn't qualify as classic colonialism
for the reasons mentioned above, it certainly was a position
of less than total independence especially in matters of
foreign policy. Jugoslav reaction to this period of Soviet
domination accounts to a great extent for their adoption of
the policy of nonalignment.
The second influence identified by Crabb is the search
for ideological identity. It has only recently been realized
in the west, and then not by all, that such issues as dem-
ocracy versus communism or Bast versus West have little if
any relevance for Third World countries. What Is important
for the individual country is that country's own traditions
and values. The policy of nonalignment confers an intellectual
45aec ii y. drabb, The Sle phant and the drass, (New
jork: Frederick A. Praege r , 19o5 5 » PP •
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and spiritual freedom to a country togo along with politi-
cal freedom. Wot only does nonalignment give a country a
sense of intellectual freedom, it also attempts to make a
positive contribution to international relations by stating
a new outlook, a fresh approach not bound by ideological
dogmatism. Nonaligned countries claim to be more objective
in assessing global issues than are tnose in the blocs.
Thus, the policy of nonalignment claims to enable a country
to play a greater role in international relations and in
settling international disputes.
This has long been an important element in Yugoslavia's
conception of nonalignment . This independent ideological
position which seeks to mediate for peace between the two
blocs is called active and peaceful coexistence by tne Yugo-
slavs. According to a common definition, the policy of active
and peaceful coexistence is simply a means of applying the
principles of the United Nations Charter to international
relations, it means collaboration with other nonaligned
countries and also collaboration with blocs or members of
blocs depending on the specific issue. In addition to work-
ing for peace in general, the principles of active peace-
ful coexistence are used to promote international coopera-
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tion in the field of economic assistance to the Third rtorld.
4b Ibid
. ,
pp. 48-58.
^Ljubomir Radovanovic, The Policy of Non-Aligned
Countries (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 19o4), pp. 9-lu.
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it should be noticed that active peaceful coexistence
as pronounced by nonaligned countries is not the peaceful
coexistence declared by the Soviet Union. Peaceful coexis-
tence to the Soviets means simply that the ultimate commun-
ist victory need not come about by military means. This
reflects the nature of modern nuclear war but is not a refu-
tation oi bloc policies and methods. The nonaligned countries
of course realize the dangers of modern weaponry by also
feel that the danger of a nuclear holocaust is made greater
by tne very existence of blocs. Consequently, the nonaligned
countries are for nuclear disarmament as well as for the
disintegration of blocs.
A third factor identified by Crabb is the political
balance in neutralist societies. The new states of Africa
and Asia are notoriously unstable. The reasons for tnis
instability are not difficult to ascertain. Many of tnese
countries are in fact artificial creations of Western colon-
ialism. Many contain various ethnic groups and tribes which
have little in common once tne fight for independence was
won. This and a general feeling of disappointment with the
results of independence , and tne problem of rising expecta-
tions and a static or declining economy make these new
states hignly explosive. Also, there's tne tradition oi
opposition to the central government dating from colonial
days. The policy of nonalignment, being an active foreign
policy, serves to unify tne diverse elements in a state.
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The policy oi' nonalignment, accompanied by periodic denun-
ciations of tiie West, is generally acceptable to trie vari-
ous groupings within a state. This policy confers much need-
ed status upon a country and its leaders. Also, it tends
to divert attention from the very real problems at home.
Thus, a policy of nonalignment is seen as instrumental in
holding tnese fragile states together until a real feeling
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of nationhood can be instilled in the people.
Another scholar has analyzed this problem from a lit-
tle different perspective. Ceorge Liska has also noted the
factionalism and instability in underdeveloped countries.
This has led to what he calls the "internationalization of
domestic politics" as various internal groups try to align
tnemselves with foreign powers. Nonalignment counteracts
this tendency by making any alignment witn foreign powers
highly suspect in the eyes of the people. Another reason
for tne policy of nonalignment is one of simple economics.
Many countries simply can't afford a defense pro 0ram and
still pursue economic development. The main economic reason
however, is that nonalignment allows a country to receive
economic aid from both sides in the Cold War. Liska states
flatly, "Nonalignment and neutralism are international
policies inspired largely by domestic concerns."
2^
^Grabb
,
The .Slephant and tne Crass , pp. 58-op.
^ieorge Liska, "The 'Third Tarty' • me Rationale
of Nonalignment , " in Neutralism and Nonalignment , ed. by
Laurence N. Martin (New fork: Frederick A. rraeger, 19o ),
p. 91.
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The case of Jugoslavia is no exception to this motive
for nonalignment
. As mentioned earlier, Tito's defiance of
Stalin rallied Jugoslavs of various ideologies and nation-
alities behind his regime. Anyone familiar with Jugoslavia
Jcnows the extreme etanic diversity of the state. There are
five main groups: Serbs, Groats, Slovenes, Macedonians,
Montenegrins and also significant numbers of Moslems,
Hungarians, and Sniptars. These nationalities are further
divided by religion, language, and cultural characteristics.
The Groats and the Serbs fought a bloody civil war during
World War 11 which had religious and political overtones.
Tne active foreign policy of nonalignment has given Tito
and Yugoslavia great status in the eyes of the world. This
has aided Tito in holding the diverse state together. This
was especially true during periods when Jugoslavia seemed
most threatened. Alas, as internat ional tensions ease some-
what, ethnic passions are again aroused and now even threaten
tne very existence of Jugoslavia.
The last reason for nonalignment identified by Grabb
is a pure strategic reason as perceived by individual states.
Obviously, the decision to align or not is one which each
country must decide upon the basis of its own history and
perception of external threat. In general however, aany
former colonial states feel that "protection" as offered
by either the West or tne East leads to a state of dependen-
cy which is neocolonialist and unacceptable in the modern
world
33
Lisk:a attacks thia problem on a world wide scale. He
cites the danger of provoking one side by aliening with a
i>reat power in a bipolar structure. "The political cost of
alliance becomes extravagant when it entails not only an
initial compromise with the ally, but tne liability of
adding his enemies to one's own as well.'^O Such a condition
can force an entire region into the bipolar structure as
each country races to be aligned with a great power. The
danger of both small scale and world wide war is thus ex-
panded. This danger of limited war in the land of the smaller
ally is heightened by the nuclear deterrence system employed
by the great powers, With nuclear war unacceptable, each
side will attempt to show that its opponent cannot protect
its corresponding small ally. Thus, the small nation is
thrust into the untenable position of being a pawn in the
larger struggle. A small country's best defense against
great power encroachments thus becomes the pressure of
world opinion as expressed by the whole community of non-
aligned countries.
Another problem is the frank question of whether or
not the West particularly can protect a small country with-
out destroying it, especially if the country is close to
the Sino-Soviet border. The case of Vietnam seems to suggest
a negative answer to tnis question. The simple fact is that
the United States appears to have been unable to protect
50 ibid.
,
p. 83.
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South Vietnam and may leave it in physical and economic
i am. However, the question is whether or not South Vietnam
could have avoided a conflict with a policy of nonalignment.
Ihe experience of Oambodia until recently seems to suggest
a. positive answer. In South Vietnam however, a military
conflict was probably Inevitable given a divided state and
an active guerrilla movement. However, with a policy of
nonalignment the conflict would not have been international-
ized and its scope would have been limited. Surely, the
state oj. South /ietnam, if not the particular government,
would nave been much better of with a policy of nonalign-
me nt
.
Ihis strategic reason is obviously one that influenced
Tito and otner Yugoslav leaders to adopt a policy of non-
alignment. As has been mentioned, there was a very real
danger of Soviet or sattelite aggression against Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia did join the Balkan fact to counteract this but
refrained from joining NATO. One reason for this refusal
was the danger of provoking the Soviet Union into an attack
on Yugoslavia. Also, standing on the border of the Soviet
bloc, there was a question of whether the West could prevent
the Yugoslavs from simply being overrun by the Soviets. In
the long run, the policy of nonalignment allowed Yugoslavia
to have more or less friendly relations with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Burope because they didn't join the Western al-
liance and add its enemies to their own.
Thus, we have the policy of nonalignment as an
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anti-thesis to blocs" in conjunction with the principles
ol active and peaceful coexistence as the common ingred-
ients in tne foreign policy of the nonaligned countries,
tfe have noted the inducements to this policy which prompted
many states including Yugoslavia to adopt this policy. We
should now examine closer the specific principles which
Yugoslavia and other nonaligned countries endorse as a basis
for international relations.
It is apparent tnat tne nonaligned countries do not
nave a monopoly on these principles. In view of our earlier
definition of active peaceful coexistence as applying the
principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,
it is not surprising that these principles correspond closely
to those of the UN and to international law. The following
were given in a semi-official Yugoslav publication as some
of the more important principles of nonalignment
.
1. The Principle of Sovereignty and Territorial Integ-
rity. This simply means the full independence of the autnor-
ity of a country from any otner authority within or without
tne state. Tne Yugoslavs claim that whenever you have blocs
it invariably means domination by one of the great powers.
Only through the dissolution of blocs will all states become
fully independent.
2. The Principle of Equality of Nations. Equality
among states and peoples is what the policy of nonalignment
is trying to bring about. Again the assumption is that the
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relations between states in a bloc or alliance is unequal
by definition.
5. The Principle of Non-Aggression, it is assumed
tnat aggression is an intregal part of bloc policies. This
is largely because of the conflict between the blocs and
in the contest for further allies in the Third World. The
danger to world peace is heightened by the arms race fos-
tered by the presence of blocs. In the absence of blocs,
all states would be isolated and taus more amenable to inter-
national law and to such a peace keeping organization as
the United Nations.
4. The Principle of Non-Interference in the Internal
Affairs of Other Oountries. Included in this is not only
overt military interference but such interference as econ-
omic and cultural pressure. The blocs in tneir struggle
for allies and footnolds are said to make interference a
way of life.
5. The Principle of Self-Determination of Nations.
This means the right of every people to form their own
state and their own political and economic system. Refer-
ence is made to the people of the world who have not yet
gained their independence, and it is stated that every
effort should be made to uproot the remnants of colonial-
ism and other forms of domination.
6. The Principle of Peaceful Settlement oi Disputes.
This means basically just what it says. In particulax, it
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means resorting to the United Nations and the procedures
there for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Bloc policies
are said to be built on the principle that might is right.
7. I'he Principle of Active International Cooperation.
All forms of peaceful international cooperation are deemed
useful. However, the United Nations is regarded as the central
means of international cooperation. Ihere can be no meaning-
ful cooperation in a world of blocs because each side attempts
to impose its own way of life on each other and on third
parties.
8. Non-Participation in the Military Alliances of
Ireat Powers. This is really the main theme of nonalignment.
Blocs are considered one of the main sources of division
in the modern world, idilitary alliances by their very nature
are held to increase international tensions. Thus, by de-
claring themselves against military alliances and not par-
ticipating in them, nonaligned countries are an effective
force for peace in the modern world .
^
Obviously, the above general principles are ideas to
which a wide variety of nations adhere if not follow in
their conduct of international relations. They parallel
well Anown concepts in internet ional law and in the Charter
of tne United Nations. There is an effort here to put non-
alignment upon as broad a base as possible so to attract
^Pet icovic
,
Non-alignment in the Conte m jo rary ^orld,
pp. 29-37.
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as many countries as possible. However, the Yugoslavs make
it clear that they are not attempting to form a third bloc
because nonalignment is against the very concept of blocs.
However, this listing of principles and their meaning
raises serious questions concerning the Yugoslav view of
the world situation. The Yugoslavs may have the proverbial
cart before the horse. The Yugoslavs and other nonaligned
states believe that blocs are a source of division in the
world and one of the principle sources of aggression. The
two blocs came into existence as the result of a fundamen-
tal conflict between two powerful states that happened to
face each other in the power vacuum that was post-war
Europe. Regardless of how this conflict is viewed, ideolog-
ical or nationalistic, the blocs reflect this conflict but
are not the source of it. However, once created the blocs
did increase tensions and served to prevent a meaningful
detente
.
Another problem is whether the blocs are a source of
aggression or whether they in fact prevent aggression, The
application of the policy of containment to Europe by the
Jnited States brought order and stability to Europe as a
whole. Whether or not this should be an objective oi your
foreign policy is another question. The creation of the
two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, brought stability
to Surope because it raised the level oi any coniiict to
that of world war. The development oi nuclear weapons and
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the subsequent '’balance of terror" is a stabilizing force
in international relations because the results of total war
are unacceptable to both sides. However, tnis fact has not
prevented tne outbreak of limited wars and wars of national
liberation. In short, the assumption that a world in which
every state exists absolutely independently is inherently
more peaceful is open to question.
Another problem is that the theory and principles of
nonalignment do not differentiate between the two blocs.
The assumption seems to be that every ally of the East or
west was forced into tne alliance and that the relationship
within the alliance is detrimental to independence, sover-
eignty, and equality of nations. Yugoslavia’s unfortunate
history in the Soviet bloc may have colored her view of all
alliances. The Brezhnev Doctrine in the Soviet bloc does
in fact limit sovereignty and condones interference and
intervention in nominally independent states. However, the
western bloc does not condone any such violations of inter-
national law and, unlike tne East, none have occurred. Of
course, the United States is the great power in the West
and assumes a position of leadership which is exercized by
political and economic pressure. These ’measures are certain-
ly not contrary to international law however, this lack oi
objectivity is one of the chief weaknesses of nonalignment
as we shall see in specific situations later.
finally, we should note the differences between clas-
sic neutrality and nonalignment . Neutrality is an old
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concept formalized by international law. It may be defined
as, inc legal position of a state which remained aloof
Irom a war between two otner states or groups of states
while maintaining certain rights towards tne belligerents
and observing certain duties prescribed by customary law
or by international conventions or treat ies. "52 According
to Fenwick, the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations
marked tne end of neutrality as a legal position because
all states were responsible for peace Keeping. However,
the neutralization of Austria in 1955 brought back tne idea
of neutrality. Austria and Switzerland by international law
and Sweden by tradition are considered neutral states today.
They refrain from participation in conflicts and take a neu-
tral or middle position between the two blocs.
Nonalignment differs from classic neutrality primar-
ily because it is an active not a passive policy. Nonaligned
countries do not take a middle position in disputes but
rather attempt to Judge the problem objectively and to find
an equitable solution. Thus, a nonaligned country may agree
or disagree with a particular bloc depending on the specif-
ic issue. This Judgement is made, at least in principle,
regardless of ideology or political system. However, this
does not imply a neutral position as regards the ideology
or political system in its intrinsic value. However, both
groups share a non-adherence to military-political groups
520harles G. Fenwick, Internat lonal Law (4th ed.
;
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and in a general struggle for peace.
Nonalignment serves a dual purpose for fugoslavia as
it does for most states professing taat policy. The first
is the taking of an independent position between the East
and the West; a policy growing out of the breax with the
Soviet Union and tne subsequent decision to to align with
tne West. The second strand is a more internationalist one.
it Involves active cooperation with tne countries of the
inlrd World and an active opposition to alliances and blocs
as sucn. Of course, any such separation of foreign policy
is somewhat artificial as each supports and complements the
other. However, it is useful for purposes of analysis,
keeping in mind that together they make for a complete
policy of nonalignment . We should now take a look at tne
internationalist aspect of fugoslavia's policy of nonalign-
ment and examine tne success or failure of this policy.
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OHAPTfiR IV
JUGOSLAVIA AND THS THIRD WORLD
Jugoslavia as a state had little if any contact with
tne Third World before the Second World War as most of
tnese states were still under colonial bondage. In the Im-
mediate post war years Jugoslavia naturally followed the
Soviet line in relation to the Third World and contacts
remained sparce and arbitrary. Jugoslavia remained cold
and distant to the Third World even after tne break with
the Soviet Union in 19^8. As has been mentioned, Jugoslavia
served with India and Sgypt as non-permanent members of
the Security douncil in 1950-51. This experience was very
important because it enabled Jugoslavia to shed some of
the Marxist illusions it had held concerning the newly in-
dependent countries. Jugoslavia discovered it snared sim-
iliar opinions and had similiar problems as these countries.
Also, Jugoslavia saw a cnance to end its relative diplomat-
ic isolation and to influence and share in the disintegra-
tion of colonialism. Jugoslavia also sought to develop econ-
omic relations with the new states.
As much as the United Nations was the bridge to the
Third World, Jugoslavia still had to establish contacts on
a bilateral basis to encourage closer ties. This sne was
gradually able to do in the following years. Visits to Third
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“ °rId countries were male by a variety of Yugoslav groups
and representatives. One of the more important visits was
as a representative to the first Asian Socialist Conference
neld in Rangoon in January 1933. Yugoslavia and Israel, both
of whoa had worked hard for the invitation, were the only
non-Asian states represented. Yugoslavia was ably represented
by Milovan DJilas and Ales Bebler. Ihey both were struck by
the force of Asian nationalism and the appeal of socialism,
as opposed to communism, to Asians at this time. Accordingly,
the Socialist Alliance, a mass front organization in Yugo-
slavia, instead of the League of Yugoslav Communists was
used as a vehicle of visits in the following years. This
practice continues today unless tne host country is avow-
edly Marxist, For their part, the Yugoslavs stressed the
similiarities between Yugoslavia and the new states of Asia,
as well as the nature of Yugoslav socialism as compared to
that of the Soviet Union. This conference served as an im-
portant link and educational device for both Yugoslavia and
the new states of Asia.^
In addition to attending this conference, Yugoslavia
established bilateral contacts with a few selected states
of Asia and Africa. For example, Yugoslavia established
diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in March of 1952 follow-
ing reciprocal visits by Foreign Ministry personnel. 01
course, the main common ingredient was an intense dislike
53hubinstein, Yugoslavia and tne Oonaligned .»orld ,
pp. 39-42.
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i'or Italy. Halle Selassie's visit to Belgrade in July 1954
was tne first by any African leader to Yugoslavia. Relations
were cemented by trade agreements and agreements on tech-
nical assistance concluded by the two countries.
Similiarly, relations with Burma began in this early
period. An important factor was the selling of arms to
Burma by Yugoslavia in December 1952. These arms enabled
the Burmese to defeat rebels and remnants of the Chinese
Nationalist Army then operating in the mountains of North-
ern Burma. Tne sale also deepened the friendship between
Tito and tne Premier of Burma, U Nu. After the overthrow
of King i'arouK in July 1952, relations with Egypt became
increasingly friendly. The sale of arms to Egypt in 1953
by Yugoslavia in the face of We stern opposition aided Yugo-
slavia's credibility in the eyes of the Egyptians. The
Yugoslav Embassy in India was established in April 1950
but reciprocal relations were not established in Belgrade
until 1954. However, relations with India gradually became
warmer largely due to the persistent efforts of Ambassador
Vilfam in New Delhi. At Tito's initiative, Ambassador
V ilfam secured an invitation to visit India for President
lito . 54
This first visit by Tito to India and Burma was very
influential in shaping Yugoslav foreign policy for the coming
years. Tito visited India from December 16, 1954 to January
3, 1955 and again from January 20 to the 25th on the way
^Ibld.
, PP. 4-3-53.
oack lro:a Burma* This was Tito's first meeting with Nehru,
the dominant figure in the Third tforld at this time, and
the two leaders found they had much in common. The sub-
stance of the consultations was expressed by a joint com-
munique issued on December 22, 1954-# The communique out-
lined tne general principles of peaceful coexistence, spec-
ified that nonalignment was an active policy and not passive
neutrality, and made it clear that this did not mean the
establishment of a third bloc.
Visiting Burma from January 6 to the 17th, Tito
stressed anticolonial themes. He called for real political
independence for all Asian people. He stated that every
country has the right to choose its own political system
depending on the conditions unique to that country. He
also called for increased economic aid for the underdevel-
oped countries. J
This visit had a significance beyond merely setting
forth the principles of nonalignment, it served to set a
pattern for the personal nature of diplomacy carried on by
these countries in tne future. Not only did Tito himseli
impress Nehru and U Nu as an individual, he made it clear
that he and Yugoslavia were in fact nonaligned and not mere-
ly pawns for Hussian communism. As a result, the nations
of Asia and Africa were favorably disposed to Tito's brand
of nonalignment and Tito and Yugoslavia became influential
^Hadovanovic
,
The Bollcy of Non-Aligned Countries,
pp. 16-18.
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In the fledging movement.
ihe next important event for nonalignment was the
Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia from
April 18 through April 24, 1955. The idea for an Afro-Asian
Conference was initiated by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali
bastroamid jo jo. He met with representatives of Burma, Ceylon,
India, and Pakistan at Colombo, Ceylon and persuaded them
to collectively sponsor such a conference. The foreign pol-
icy objectives of these countries, conveniently known as
the Colombo group, have been described as follows: the
avoidance of war especially between China and the United
States, the development of China' 's independence from the
Soviet Union, and the containment of Chinese and Vietminh
political and military power. 56
The conference was attended by twenty-four countries
in addition to the sponsoring five. These countries were
all from Asia and Africa and included representatives from
both blocs and neutralist countries. For example, such oppos-
ing states as China and Japan, and North and South Vietnam
were present, as well as the few new states in Africa and
most of the Middle Bast states. Bor this reason the confer-
ence is not considered a nonaligned conference.
The wide diversity of the countries represented ac-
counts for some of the disputes that occurred at the meeting.
56george M. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca,
New fork: Cornell University Press, 195o) , pp. 1-10.
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Ohou-Bn-Lai represented China (Nationalist China was not
represented) and was a model of friendliness and decorum.
He publicly and privately assured one and all that China
did not want a war with the United States or with anyone
else for that matter. Actually, the main source of discord
was between Nehru and those countries aliened with the West.
Nehru introduced the Pancn Shila, the five principles of
coexistence, which Tito had agreed to in December. Nehru
was particularly upset over the formation of 3BAT0 which
he saw as the extension of blocs and bloc policy in the
Third rtorld. Carlos P. Romulo, representing the Philippines,
replied that the Philippines peacefully coexisted with all
states but that communist states did not seem to believe
in this. He called SBATO a realistic defensive strategy
to combat communist aggression. Speaking on the conference
later, General Romulo stated, "it is no exaggeration to
say that the ant i-communist states put both communism and
neutralism on the defensive, scoring a signal diplomatic
triumph for the free world. "57
The states at the conference issued a final communi-
que which stated their objectives. These were general ideas
about which everybody could agree. These included economic
cooperation among Afro-Asian states and increased aid from
the developed world, cultural exchanges, an end to racism,
57 Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel
Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1956), p. 22.
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independence for all people and tne end of colonialism,
general d isarmament
,
and a call for world peace and cooper-
ation between tne two blocs. In particular, tney set forth
ten principles which snould guide international conduct,
inese Bandung Principles" are often quoted and referred
to. They are as follows}
1* Respect for fundamental human rights and for the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of all
nations large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the
internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the rignt of each nation to defend itself
singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter
of tne United Nations.
6. (a) Abstention from tne use of arrangements of collec-
tive defence to serve the particular interests of
any of the big powers.
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures
on other countries.
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the
use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any country.
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful
means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration
or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means
of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the
Charter of the United Nations.
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.
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10.
Respect for justice and international obligations.
In spite of these lofty principles, it is clear that
58gahin, The Asian-African Conference , pp. 84-85.
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the Bandung Conference didn't achieve the foreign policy
objectives of the Colombo group who convened the conference.
Of course, tnere has not been a war between China and the
United States and China has become independent of the Soviet
Union but these two occurrences certainly didn't develop
because of the influence of Bandung, The third objective,
tne containment of Chinese and Vietminh military power and
political influence, is still in doubt. In any case, the
presence of tne United States has "contained" the communist
presence in South and Southeast Asia. In spite of repeated
allusions to tne "Spirit of Bandung," the conference has
had little real influence. This is because it lacked any
machinery for implementing these lofty ideals. They failed
also because of the diverse nature of the group assembled
at Bandung. With representatives from both camps and neu-
tralist states, the only agreements possible are bound to
be bland and ineffective. Sven with the more narrowly de-
fined nonaligned states, reacning agreement on anything
significant remains a problem.
However, the conference did have a symbolic signif-
icance in that it served notice on the Bast and tne West
that all future decisions must consider this grouping.
Homulo states, "Bandung was, in a manner of speaking, a
historical pageant, symbolizing tne coming of age of Asia
and Africa. "59 The significance for Yugoslavia, which was
59jciomulo, The Meaning of Bandung , p. 35.
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not represented at the conference in any manner, lay in
the irustration felt by Nehru, U Nu and other neutrals at
being stymied by the non-communist states, From this date
tney were more receptive to Yugoslavia's conception of non-
alignment
.
in the next few years Yugoslavia stepped up its foreign
policy offensive to the Third World, in 19 56 Tito invited
Nehru to Belgrade for a reciprocal visit and, in a calcu-
lated move, also invited the young revolutionary Sgyptian
leader, darnel Abdel Nasser, who he had first met in February
1955. These leaders met at Brioni, Tito's island retreat,
in July 1956. In a Joint communique issued on July 19, the
three leaders decried the tension and apprehensive atmosphere
prevalent in the world and blamed the division of the world
into military blocs for this atmosphere. The three leaders
also vowed to maintain regular correspondence and personal
visits to discuss issues of the day.°^
Tito also stepped up contacts with tne rapidly increas-
ing number of new states in Africa and Asia. For his mode
of contact, Tito cnose tne same method as he had employed
so successfully before, tnat is, personal contact. In Decem-
ber 195B Tito embarked on a three month voyage that saw him
visit Indonesia, Burma, India, Oeylon, Ethiopia, the Sudan,
the U.A.R.
,
and Sreece. Again in the spring of 1961 Tito
paid the first visit by a communist leader to rfest Airlca.
^Aad ovanovlc
,
The Policy of Non-Aligned Countries,
pp. 20-22.
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He visited Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco,
iunisia and the J.A.R. These visits by Tito were reinforced
by numerous visits by Yugoslav labor, trade, political, and
governmental figures. Throughout his visits, Tito stressed
one dominant tneme, anticolonialism. Rubinstein states,
Ant i- colonial ism has become tne Yugoslav credit card to
the Third World.
This committment can be seen in two specific instan-
ces. The first was Yugoslavia's unwavering support of Egypt
during the Suez Crisis of 1956. Although tne dominant Third
dorid role was played by Nehru, Tito's support was much
appreciated by Nasser. Yugoslavia was also an early and
strong supporter of tne ELN, the independence movement in
Algeria. Yugoslavia supported Algeria's was of independence
to a degree unmatched by Yugoslavia before or since. Yugo-
slavia covertly supplied small arms to tne rebels, the only
known instance in which Yugoslavia supported a national lib-
eration struggle to this extent. Tito took this position
despite the bad effect it had on relations with France. Tito
seems to have taking a strong personal liking to Ahmed Ben
Bella, the ELN leader. The Yugoslavs seemed to liken to
Algerian struggle to their own war for independence during
World War 11 and consequently supported it with a nostalgic
. 62
vigor.
^Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Third World , p. 91.
° 2ibld.
, pp. 75-106.
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We should take a brief look at the international sit-
uation as it existed in the late 50* s and early 60's. The
relationship between the East and West was increasingly
tense. The collapse of tne Paris Summit Meeting due to be
held in I960, the deadlocked nuclear test ban talks, the
chaos in the Congo and the UN intervention, the conflict
over the role of the Secretary General of the UN, and
Castro’s takeover of Cuba and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, all
conspired to make tne international situation extremely
tense at this time. This situation plus the increasing im-
portance of nonalignment due to the rapid decolonization
in Africa made the calling of the Belgrade Conference of
Nonaligned Nations a natural consequence.
The idea was initiated at a meeting between Tito and
Nasser in Brioni in the summer of I960. Later, on April 22,
1961, a joint communique was issued by Tito and Nasser
calling for a conference of nonaligned countries to dis-
cuss the international situation. A preparatory conference
was held in Cairo in June 1961 where Sukarno of Indonesia
also became a sponsor. Prime Minister Nehru was conspicous-
iy absent as a sponsor of the conference. Nenru was upset
over the selection of the countries invited to attend,
feeling that more countries should be invited. Tnis reflec-
ted disagreement over the definition of nonalignment and
Nehru's doubts over the efficacy of such a conference. He
finally accepted his invitation on August 9, 1961, a mere
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three weeks before the scheduled conference .63
The final criteria for selecting states to attend tne
projected conference were as follows:
1. Membership in neitner the communist nor the Western
military bloc,
-• ihe absence of any bilateral military arrangement
with a bloc country,
3. The absence of a foreign military base on that state’s
territory or the expressed opposition to such a base.
4. The support of liberation and independence movements,
5. The pursuit of a foreign policy based on peaceful
coexistence. °4
It will be noticed that no mention was made of the
internal political or economic system of the states. Thus,
the conference included military or feudal dictatorships,
democracies, one-party socialist states, and a communist
state. The specific states sending delegates were as follows:
Afghanistan, Algeria. (Provisional Government), Burma, Cam-
bodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea,
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R. , Yemen, and Yugo-
slavia. Observors attended from Bolivia, Brazil, and
Ecuador. Many of these countries attended the Bandung Con-
ference while others, especially the new African states,
were not even independent at the time oi the earlier con-
ference. In addition, many of the same leaders present at
6 3lbid
. ,
pp. 104-106.
64j
.
Burton, ’'introduct ion to Nonalignment,* in
Nonalignment , ed. by J. W. Burton (London: Andre Deutsch
Limited, 19^6), pp. 19-21.
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Bandung also attended the Belgrade Conference
. These inclu-
ded J Nu of Burma, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, Haile Se-
lassie of Ethiopia, and of course, Nehru, Nasser, and
Su.carno. 33 ihis continuity of charismatic leaders did much
to popularize the policy of nonalignment and gave it an
importance it perhaps did not intrinsically deserve.
On August 31 , the day before the conference was sched-
uled to begin, the Soviet Union announced its intention to
break the moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing. This
was obviously a deliberate slap in the face of Tito and the
whole policy of nonalignment
. In spite of the fact that
this announcement changed the whole complexion of the con-
ference, Tito failed to even mention it in his opening ad-
dress. Other leaders, while mentioning it, failed to con-
demn it in the strong terms one might have expected. For
example, Nehru only stated that he "deeply regretted" the
Soviet decision. Tito, in an address delivered on September 3,
first attacked Prance for failing to comply with the resolu-
tions of the UN concerning discontinuance of nuclear tests.
He then noted that, "The matters have now reached a point
where the Soviet government has published a statement on
the resumption of nuclear weapons tests. Slsewhere, he
^^The Conference of Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade: Public 1st icko-izdavacki
Zavod, ' 19ol)
,
p. 2o3.
66 ,*The Speech Delivered by Josip Broz Tito," in
Belgrade Conference , p. 156.
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states that the Soviet decision is understandable but he
questioned the timing of the announcement. There was no
censure or rebuke of any kind! Tnis position lost Tito
many friends in the West and brought into question the im-
partiality oi the policy of nonalignment
. Sven such a Tito
supporter as Rubinstein states, ”By his equivocation Tito,
the father of nonalignment, dealt his creation, at its mo-
ment of maturation, a blow from which it never recovered. '*67
in their speeches and declarations, the delegates
discussed familiar themes such as colonialism and neocolon-
ialism, disarmament and the arms race, and economic devel-
opment and cooperation. Although the official Belgrade
Declaration stressed all three themes, there was a dispute
between the Asian and African delegates over what the main
source of discord was in tne world. The Africans, whose
main spokesman was Kwame Nkrumah of lhana, stressed colon-
ialism in all its forms. In his speech Nkrumah stated, "l
have stressed over and over again that colonialism is a
fundamental cause of war. 1’^ Nehru stated the Asian posi-
tion. "iJ’irst things must come first, and nothing is more
important or has more priority than the world situation of
war and peace.”69 Having stated tnis, Nehru revealed a realism
6 7 Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and tne Nona l igned World ,
p. 108.
66
”The Speech Delivered by Kwame Nkrumah," in Belgrade
Conference
, p. 103.
69
"Tne Speech Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru, in
Belgrade Conference, p. 10b.
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lacking in most ol the other delegations including Yugo-
slavia. tie warns that the nonaligned states ’’must not over-
estimate our own importance” and that "numbers alone do
not create a force." Unfortunately, this advice fell on
deaf ears.
As a result of the presence of the new African lead-
ers in what might be called their first public appearance,
the Belgrade Declaration dealt at length on colonialism.
It pledged support for liberation and independence move-
ments throughout the world and condemned the apartheid
policy of South Africa and the Portuguese repression in
Africa. The Declaration condemned the stationing of French
troops in Tunisia and welcomed the Algerian delegate, Prime
Minister Ben Khedda of the Provisional Government, as the
rightful representative of Algeria. On September 5"^, the
delegation from the Congo arrived headed by Prime Minister
Cyrille Adoula and Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga.
The Declatation stated support for the present Congolese
government and opposition to Moishe Tshombe. This was also
Yugoslavia's position on the Congo question. 70
The Declaration demands that every effort should be
made to decrease the widening economic gap between the few
rich nations and the many poor ones. It also states that
countries receiving aid should be able to determine the
use of that aid as they see fit. The Declaration recommends
70
•' declaration of tne Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries," in Belgrade Conference , pp. 2
r53--ol.
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the convening of a conference of underdeveloped nations to
discuss their common problems. Such a conference was actual-
ly held in Cairo from July 8 to 19, 1962.
l'he Declaration states that disarmament is one of
the most urgent tasks of mankind. The Declaration calls for
not only a ban on nuclear tests but the elimination of all
armed forces and armaments. Point eighteen of the Declara-
tion calls for the presence of nonaligned countries at dis-
armament talks and that all disarmament discussions be held
under the auspices of the United Nations. This point did
have a practical effect as the Disarmament Oommission of
the United Nations added eight representatives from non-
nuclear Third World states to its membership. Point nine-
teen of the Declaration urged that an agreement on the pro-
hibition of all nuclear tests should be immediately con-
cluded. Some observors feel that the favorable influence
of the Belgrade Conference aided in the adoption of the
limited test ban treaty of August 1963.^
In a separate document entitled “Statement on the
Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace,'* the delegates
plead particularly to the United States and to the Soviet
Union to cease their preparations for war and to seek peace
ful negotiations as the means of resolving disputes. Accord
ingly, the delegates drafted an identical letter to John P.
Kennedy, President of the United States, and to Nikita
^Ljubomir Radovanovic, The Yugoslav Views on Dls-
armame nt (Belgrade. Medunarodna Politika, 1 964 ) , op. 3- 19.
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Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Soviet Union. The letter states that the countries attend-
ing the Belgrade Conference fear the outbreak of nuclear
war which would threaten the very existence of mankind.
The two states are urged to negotiate for peace rather
than prepare for war.
The dual letter was carried to Washington and Moscow
by special representatives, Sukarno and Keito to Washington
and Nehru and Nkrumah to Moscow. Both states accepted the
unsolicited advice without fanfare. The Soviet Union had
previously shown its disregard for nonalignraent by the tim-
ingof its nuclear test announcement. The United States was
angered over the lack of a response to this announcement
and the lack of impartiality by the nonaligned countries.
As one observer notes, "Bandung proved nonalignment existed,
Belgrade did not prove that it will be listened to."^ 2
In spite of the apparent lack of effect of the first
Nonaligned Conference, Tito and others looked upon it as
a success and called for continued activity and coopera-
tion among tne nonaligned. Tito viewed with alarm the Cuban
missile crisis of 1902 and the Sino-Indian border war in
the same year. Accordingly, in May of 1983 he persuaded
Nasser to Jointly call for another conference of nonaligned
countries. After a preliminary meeting in January 1904 in
'^Richard Sott, ’‘The Decline of Neutralism: The
Belgrade Conference and After," Survey of International
Affairs 19ol » 1903, P» 38Y.
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Colombo, the conference was held in Cairo from October 5
to 10, 1964. The international situation was rather stable
at this time and there were definite signs that the blocs
were becoming less cohesive.
Tne Second Conference of Nonaligned States was attended
by a throng of forty-seven countries and ten additional
countries, mainly Latin American, attending as observers.
This large number of countries was one of the sources of
discord at the Cairo Conference. Tito, of course, still
hailed the conference as a success but there was evidence
of much disagreement over the direction the movement was
to taice. This disagreement reflected tne advent of Commun-
ist China Into tne Third tforld. In order to understand this
impact, we must briefly loo* at Chinese-Yugoslav relations.
In the early years tne Chinese position mirrored that
of the Soviets. Wnen tne Chinese Communists won control of
the mainland in 1949, they did not establish relations with
Yugoslavia because of Tito's ouster from the Cominform in
1946. Following Stalin's death in 1953, the Chinese followed
Khrushchev's lead in restoring friendly relations with
Yugoslavia. Diplomatic relations between China and Yugoslavia
were established in January 1955* However, iollowing inci-
dents in Poland and Hungary in 195o» the Chinese leaders
took an increasingly doctrinaire position on foreign policy
matters. At a conference called in November 1957 in Moscow
in order to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the
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Russian Revolution, the Chinese won a tactical victory over
the Jugoslavs. They succeeded in persuading the Russians
to Insist on reaffirmation of subordination to Moscow and
the OPSU. When Tito refused to sign the resulting Declara-
tion of Unity containing tnis provision, Yugoslav relations
with both Moscow and Peking deteriated. All invited commun-
ist parties boycotted the Seventh Congress of the LYC in
April 1958 because of the alleged heresies in the Yugoslav
program. The Chinese Ambassador in Belgrade and the Yugo-
slav Ambassador in Peking both left their posts not to re-
turn for twelve years. The Chinese outdid the Russians in
their vehement criticism of Tito's "revisionist clique."
The Chinese stated that the 194-8 ouster from the Cominform
was "basically correct.
In April I960 a violent attack on Tito and his follow-
ers appeared in Red Plag, the Chinese theoretical journal.
The article ridiculed "peaceful coexistence" as inferior
to "people's revolution" which should be carried out through-
out the world. Of course, this and similiar attacks were
made on Yugoslavia but the real intention was to criticize
Khrushchev. In September 1963 an article entitled "is Yugo-
slavia a Socialist Country?" appeared in Red Flag, it was
a vehement denunciation of Titoisin and accused Tito of "serv-
ing American imperialism." Reminiscent of the 1948 Cominform
Declaration, the article called on the Yugoslav people to
73Milorad M. Drachkovitch, "Yugoslavia," in T^
Communist States at the Crossroads, ed. by Adam Bromke
(New York! Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) » PP» 179-19o.
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rise up and overthrow their leaders. The Chinese have re-
mained critical of Titoistn as a program even though rela-
tions with the state of Yugoslavia have improved. Of course,
the Sino-Soviet dispute has deepened and come out in the
open since the early 60's. This has had the ironic effect
of bettering Yugoslav-Soviet relations. 74
One of the main areas of tension between Red China
Yugoslavia was and is the Third World. In the early sixties
the Chinese made an active effort to achieve influence in
the Third World. Their chief spokesman in this endeavor be-
came President Sukarno of Indonesia. Sukarno came into direct
conflict with Tito over the advisability of calling a second
Conference of Nonaligned States. Sukarno wanted to call a
second Bandung, a conference of Afro-Asian states which
would exclude Yugoslavia on a geographical and racial basis.
A preparatory meeting was held in Jakarta in April 1964 and
it was agreed to hold a strictly Afro-Asian Conference in
Algiers in June 1965.
Meanwhile, Tito and Sukarno carried on their debate
at the Cairo Conference, following Peking's line, Sukarno
questioned the viability of peaceful coexistence when the
world was dominated by imperialism, colonialism, and racial
discrimination. Only when these evils were eliminated by
active confrontation with the West could a policy of peace-
ful coexistence be established. Tito countered by criticizing
74 Ibid-» PP« 179-198
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those who accept peaceful coexistence between the super
powers but who advocate a general conflagration in the
inird world. Although the final declaration smoothed over
tne differences with the usual rhetoric, it was obvious
that serious differences existed at the Cairo Conference. 7 ^
The projected Conference of Afro-Asian states never
did take place. The overthrow of Ben Bella right before the
scneduled conference forced its postponement to November
1965. Then the API, the Indonesian Communist Party, attemp-
ted a coup on September 30, 1965 with Sukarno's encourage-
ment. When the Indonesian military harshly put down the
coup and slowly ousted Sukarno, Peking's influence began
to wane in the Third World. The second Bandung was post-
poned indefinitely following the revolts in Algeria and
Indonesia.
^
Peking did join with Cuba in convening a Tri-Continental
Conference in Havana in January 1966. This conference brought
together a mixture of about sixty leftist movements and
organizations not necessarily representing their respective
countries. Although the Soviet Union participated, Yugoslav
observers were barred from the conference. Peking and Cuba
condemned Yugoslavia for being against armed revolutionary
struggle and for appeasing the Americans with their policy
75aubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonallgned World, ,
pp. 299-303.
76 ib id.
, pp. 303-307.
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of peaceful coexistence. This insignificant conference sig-
nalled. the decline of Peking's influence in the Third World.
The downfall of Ben Bella, Sukarno, and Nkrumah made many
new states leery of friendly relations with Peking.
It is interesting to hear recent Chinese declarations
at the United Nations declaring Communist China a nonaligned
country between the two super powers. Apparently, Peking
is making another drive for influence in the Third World.
Although Chinese-Yugoslav relations have improved recently
as witnessed by the exchange of ambassadors for the first
time in twelve years in May 1970, the possibility of con-
flict over influence in the Third World is still real. A
Yugoslav writer seemed to foresee such a conflict when he
wrote, "Although she is factually 'non-aligned' in relation
to the blocs and superpowers— she does not belong among the
nonaligned countries .
"
7 (
Following the waning of Chinese influence in the Third
World, Tito pressed for a third Conference of Nonaligned
Countries. At first the reaction to this idea was not favor-
able. However, Tito did influence fifty-one nonaligned
countries to meet in Belgrade between July 8 and July 12, 19-9
to consult on the possibility of a third Nonaligned Confer-
ence. The representatives did agree on the desirability of
such a conference but a daLe was not set and plans remained
77Kanko Petkovic, "The Non-Aligned and China," Review
of international Affairs, October 5, 1970, p. 4.
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vague. Cn largely Tito's initiative, a preparatory meeting
was held in Dar-es-Salaam from April 13 to 17, 1970. Here,
final plans were made for the upcoming conference. The agen-
da was discussed and it was decided to invite countries
upon the same basis as laid down in the Cairo Preparatory
Conference in 1961
The third Conference of Nonaligned States was held
at Lusaka, Zambia from September 8 to 10, 1970. It was
attended by representatives of fifty-four states and ob-
servers from nine other states and representatives from
eight liberation movements. Reflecting the rapid pace of
decolonializat ion, thirty-four of the fifty-four countries
attending were African. Many states such as Bgypt
,
Algeria,
Cuba, Grhana, Kenya, and others were represented at the con-
ference by foreign Ministers or other lesser officials rather
than by heads of state. This may have reflected the less
than rabid enthusiasm for the conference. However, many of
the stars of nonalignment did appear including Tito, Premier
Bandaranaike of Ceylon, Haile Selassie, Mrs. Indira Sandhi,
79
and Archbishop Makarios.
'
As the conference itself proceeded, It was obvious
that the face of nonalignment had darkened considerably.
The African states dominated by the sheer weight of their
78'Vinal Communique of the Preparatory Meeting of Non-
Aligned Countries," Review of International Affairs , August,
1970, p. 31.
79 Mihird Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Lusaka,
Review of Internat ional Affairs, September 20, 1970, pp. 11-33.
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reportedly received the largest applause of anyone at the
conierence. On the Middle East, the conference called for
Israel to withdraw to pre-1967 positions and recommended
sanctions if Israel did not comply. The delegates also
called for the recognition of the rights of the Palestin-
ians.^
On his return to Yugoslavia, President Tito praised
the results of the conference saying it exceeded all expecta-
tions. lie especially remarked on the degree of unity achieved
on such questions as colonialism and neocolonialism, racial
discrimination, economic development, disarmament, and peace.
He also praised the united stand taken against the presence
of foreign troops in Southeast Asia, the stand against
Israel's aggression in the Middle East, and the support
for liberation movements in Southern Africa. Realizing of
course, that the positions taken were almost diametrically
opposed to the position of the United States and the West,
Tito took pains to assure tne West of his continued impar-
tiality. Twice in his speech he stated, "It was not directed
against either of the great powers or any other countries,
A O
as some have maintained."
This conference has had about as much influence as
previous conferences, that is, little or nothing. Merely
bl
"Third Oonference , " Review of International Affairs ,
September 20, 1970, pp. 11-35.
82,,Unity and Solidarity, Statement by President Tito
upon His-«Return from Lusaka, Sept. 12, 1970,' Review .of
International Affairs, September 20, 1970, p. 3o.
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numbers. The central issue of the conference and the princi-
pal area of agreement was strong objection to the continued
rule of white minorities in Southern Africa. Realizing this,
President Tito, the father of nonalignment
,
was content to
remain in the background and let President Kaunda of the
host country Gambia bask in the limelight. ^0
The conference issued two declarations and fifteen
resolutions. They covered the familiar themes of nonalign-
ment but the statements against colonialism and the atten-
tion paid to economic development dominated the written
declarations and tne speeches. On specific crises areas,
the conference dwelt on Southern Africa, Southeast Asia,
and the Middle East. Concerning Southern Africa, the con-
ference declared its condemnation of apartheid and vowed
to aid liberation movements in areas still controlled by
Portugal. All countries trading with these lands and
Rhodesia were condemned and sanctions were recommended
against them. On Southeast Asia, the conference recommended
the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Southeast Asia.
They condemned the Lon Nol regime and called for the restor-
ation of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia. They also called for
a negotiated settlement for Vietnam. The delegates elected
to admit Mme Nguyen The Binh, Minister of Poreign Affairs
of the Vietnam Provisional Government (Viet Cong). She
8C>Marvine Howe, "Unaligned Pind Common Cause in Africa,"
New fork Times, September 13, 19Y0, sec. 4, p. 2.
to meet together and agree on the desirability of peace
and the evils of colonialism and racial discrimination does
not accomplish anything. In fact, as regards South Africa,
even tne Organization of African Unity, which is hardly
that, has disagreed over the issue of how to deal with the
Republic of South Africa. These repeated conferences and
summit meetings, as much as Tito may enjoy them, nave proved
unsuccessful in solving actual world problems. Prime Minis-
ter Nehru spoke the truth wnen he voiced this fear at the
Belgrade Conference. "On tne other hand, a fear creeps in
upon my mind that we may not be able to get out of the rut
of meeting together, passing long resolutions and making
brave declarations, and then going home and allowing the
world to drift to disaster."*^
Related to the Inadequacy of these conferences is the
general failure of the nonallgned states to prevent wars
and aggression even within their own ranks. The failure
of the nonallgned states to condemn Chinese aggression
against India in 190 2 and their failure to prevent the con-
flict made India realize tnat moral pressure is no substi-
tute for adequate defense. Although Yugoslavia and xne rest
of the nonallgned world were staunchly behind Egypt in the
Arab-israeli War of 190Y, their support did not prevent the
war from happening nor did it prevent Egypt from absorbing
a sound defeat. Tne specoor of one small country defeating
S^ihe Speech Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru," in
Belgrade Conference , pp. 109-110.
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another, while the big powers merely played referee, really
brought into the question the efficacy of nonalignment.
Similiarly
,
the nonaligned states have been unable to stop
the Vietnam War nor the present India-Pakistan conflict.
in addition to having little or no practical influence,
many of the nonaligned countries have practiced the very
brand of power politics they piously condemn when practiced
by the super powers. A. glaring example is the overt inter-
vention by Egypt in Yemen in the middle sixties. Another
example is Indonesia's aggression in Borneo and another is
India's take over of Goa. -i-hese countries have apparently
felt no contradiction in these actions and Yugoslavia has
supported them, it is little wonder that the superpowers,
both East and West, receive these countless exhortations
for peace and nonagression with more than a little skep-
ticism. Recently, Yugoslavia expressed the opinion that
the Bangla Desh movement is "clearly a national liberation
struggle" and not a civil war. They favor the liberation
84
and independence of Bangla desh. It would be interesting
to note Yugoslavia's reaction to a free Croatia movement
for example. Such a situation is not that improbable.
One of the many resolutions of the Lusaka Conference
and an issue which was given a great deal of attention is
st rengthening tne United Nations. The nonaligned and par-
ticularly Yugoslavia have always felt strongly about the
A. Naik, "The Why and What of the Bangla Desh
Movement , " Beview of Internat ional ^fidirs , Jup^e b, l)il,
pp. 18-19.
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United Nations. It is one of the few areas in which the
nonaligned have been relatively successful although the
success of the UN itself is open to debate. In the absence
of military alliances, the vJN could and should be a pro-
tector of the independence and integrity of smaller nations.
Jugoslavia in particular feels that the support given them
in the UN in 1951 when they brought a complaint forward
against the Soviet Union was instrumental in protecting their
independence
.
One of the first areas in which the nonaligned under-
took action more or less as a group was the issue of decol-
onialization. In fact, one writer states unequivically that
to tne nonaligned in the UN, "The principle function-and
the most urgent one-is to rid the world of the last ves-
tiges of Western colonialism. "°6 Jugoslavia has long cham-
pioned this goal and was a charter member of the Special
Committee on Colonialism established in 1961. Sven though
the pace of decolonization has been very rapid and is al-
most complete, the continued Portuguese holdings in Africa
have kept the issue alive. Despite repeated pronouncement
s
against intervention, Jugoslavia justifies intervention in
these areas in support of liberation movements. This is be-
cause tne fight against colonialism is supreme and outweighs
any convictions or laws against intervention.
85j?rano i s o. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the
United Nations," in Neutralism and Nonalignment , ed. by
Martin, p. 126 • -
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Ihe Jugoslavs have long been in favor of and a par-
ticipant in the UN's peacekeeping role. Yugoslavia supported
the "Uniting for Peace" resolution in 1950 which authorized
the General Assembly to consider the use of armed force to
secure the peace. Yugoslavia participated in the United
Nations Emergency Force created during the Suez Crisis in
1956. it was the first and is still the only communist
country to participate in a UN peacekeeping role. Yugoslavia
has even paid its assessed share of the costs which is
rather unusual for all states. Yugoslavia contributed per-
sonnel to the United Nations Operation in the Congo in
I960 but withdrew her personnel in December because it ob-
jected to the direction the UN was taking in the Congo.
Nevertheless, after a period of indecision, Yugoslavia
announced that it would pay its share of the costs. How-
ever, Yugoslavia has been inconsistent here as well. Al-
though generally favoring the UN as a peacekeeping force
rather than one of the superpowers, Yugoslavia has opposed
UN intervention when it would go against practical polit-
ical considerations of Yugoslavia. For example, Yugoslavia
opposed efforts to place a UN presence in Yemen during the
"Civil War" there from 1964 to 1967.
^
Yugoslavia has consistently stood for universality
of membership in the UN. She was in favor of admitting Red
China even when that state was making its most vituperative
86Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned tforld ,
pp. 138-150.
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attacks on the “renegade Tito clique/' Yugoslavia has also
called ior an increased role for the nonaligned nations in
the Secretariat and in the UN in general. Yugoslavia was
in the forex ront of the fight for increased membership in
tne security Council and tne Economic and Social Council
which was successful in 1964. Yugoslavia and the rest of
the nonaligned countries present at the Belgrade Conference
made clear their distaste for the troika system proposed
b,y Khrushchev
. Accordingly, Yugoslavia was in the forefront
oi tne compromise that saw U Thant emerge as the Secretary
General. 8?
As the number of nonaligned countries has grown, in-
creasing importance has been place on economic development
and the main forum for this objective has been the UN.
Yugoslavia has long been in favor of multilateral aid
through the UN rather than bilateral programs because it
states that bilateral aid leads to economic and political
dependence and involvement in the bloc structure of the
world. Yugoslavia was active in the proposal leading to the
Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
(SUNFSD) although other sources, specifically India, pro-
vided most of the initiative. Yugoslavia was elected to
the Economic and Social Council in October 27 , 1952. The
significance of these early moves was that they brought
Yugoslavia into the ranks of tne Afro-Asian states.
^Ibid.
, pp. 151-158.
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In the late fifties, Yugoslavia put increasing em-
phasis on international trade as one of the primary obsta-
cles to economic development. Yugoslavia was thinking in
terms of her own development as well as she found herself
outside both the Common Market and COMECON
. The Belgrade
Declaration set in motion proposals which led to the first
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
in Geneva in March 1964. One Yugoslav success was being
included as one of the ftT7 Less Developed Countries (LDC'S).
Yugoslavia generally pursued a moderate course in these
proceedings realizing that tne rich countries can not be
forced to aid the poorer ones. Although the second UNCTAD
was less tnan a success, the resolutions emanating from
Lusaka and from Yugoslavia look forward with great enthus-
iasm to the third UNCTAD scheduled for 1972.
68 ibid., pp. 159-185
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CHAPTER V
NONALIGrNMBNT ' S IMPACT ON YUGOSLAVIA
It was stated earlier that the most important reasons
for any country to choose a policy of nonalignment were
particular concerns of the individual nation state. These
concerns were and are both strategic and economic. We have
seen that the policy of nonalignment as an international
movement has been something less than a success. However,
if the policy of nonalignment has served the national in-
terests of Yugoslavia as a particular nation state, then
we must consider it a success from a Yugoslav point of
view. Let us briefly examine how the policy of nonalign-
ment has served the needs of Yugoslavia.
Eirst and foremost, we should consider the question
of Yugoslav security and independence
.
The policy of non-
alignment has served to maintain Yugoslavia's political
independence in the world. Yugoslavia remains neither a
member of the Western military bloc nor of the Soviet mil-
itary bloc. Maintaining this degree of independence has
not been easy considering the many explosive issues in the
world during the last twenty years and Yugoslavia's geo-
graphical proximity to the Eastern bloc and the Soviet
Union. Relations with the Soviet Union have been the key
to Yugoslavia's remaining nonaligned and independent.
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Ihe policy of nonalignment has been successful in
maintaining Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union,
delations with the Soviet Union have swung like a pendulum
between friendliness and hostility since 1948, although
the friendliness never matched the closeness of the 1945-
48 period nor did the hostility match that of 1948-53. It
is apparent that the Soviet Union values good relations
with Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia feels the same way. Yugo-
slavia's present leadership would probably prefer good re-
lations with the Soviet Union over good relations with the
West if the choice ever had to be made. Nevertheless, Yugo-
slavia has criticized and opposed Soviet actions which she
felt were violations of international law and proletarian
internationalism.
Relations with the Soviet Union began to improve af-
ter Stalin's death in March 1953. Ambassadors were exchanged
in June 1953 for tne first time since 1948, although diplo-
matic relations had never been completely broken. Economic
agreements were made in October 1954 and in January 1955.
Although Tito and other Yugoslavs certainly welcomed this
trend toward normalization, they remained skeptical and con-
tined their close relations with the West. You will recall
that the Balkan Pact was signed in August 1954. Then,
Khrushchev dropped a bombshell when he announced that a
Soviet delegation headed by him, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and
Gromyko intended to visit Yugoslavia in May 1955#
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'Inis was Khrushchev 1 s first real appearance on the
international scene and the visit didn't always go well.
I he mere fact tnat the Russians went to Belgrade, home of
the heretic Tito, was a great victory for Tito. Khrushchev
arrived at Belgrade Airport on May 26, 1955 and, in a speech
given at the airport, blamed Beria, Abakumov, and others
for the rift in 1946. Tito and tne Yugoslavs met this with
silence knowing that Stalin himself was responsible. Khrush-
chev was furious. Sven years later in Khrusnchev Remembers ,
he states that he was "somewhat disappointed" by the "cool
reception" at the airport.
Khrushchev attempted to heal the breach by strengthen-
ing inter-party relationships and stressing the role of
tneir respective communist parties in building socialism.
The Yugoslavs would not go tnat far and insisted on stress-
ing only governmental relations. In fact, the Belgrade
Declaration issued at the close of the conference made no
reference to inter-party relations. The statements in tnis
declaration reflected a clear victory for Tito and his pol-
icies. In particular it states, "Questions of internal org-
anization, or difference in social systems and of different
forms of Socialist development, are solely the concern of
tne individual countries." This obviously condones Tito's
separate road to socialism. Another clause states, "The
recognition that the policy of military blocs increases
international tension, undermines confidence among nations
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and augments the danger of war. "89 This was and is a main
strand of Jugoslav ioreign policy. However, it was a curious
statement for the Russians to make. The Warsaw Treaty estab-
lishing the Warsaw Pact had just been signed on May 14, 1955.
Yugoslavia has never joined the Warsaw Pact.
This was the nature of the rapprochement between Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet Union. It was rather short lived how-
ever. The first international occurrence to strain the re-
lationship was the Hungarian revolution in October 1956.
Tito, in a speech at Pula, took the position that the first
Soviet intervention was wrong and unjustified because social-
ism was still in control in Hungary. Tito did reluctantly
agree that the second intervention by Soviet troops was
justified because tne revolution had become anti-socialist
in character. The Russians of course reacted angrily and
Yugoslav-Soviet relations were once again at a low ebb.
The Russians blamed the influence of Titoism for their
troubles in Eastern Europe. We nave already mentioned the
boycott of the eigth LYO Congress in April 1958 by the Soviet
bloc. We have also mentioned the Yugoslav refusal to endorse
Soviet hegemony at various high level communist meetings.
By the early sixties however, the antaganism had largely
run its course and increasing Chinese pressure had brought
tne two countries closer together. A sign oi this was a new
^9”joint Soviet- Yugoslav Declaration, Belgrade, June
2, 1955,” in The Soviet- Yugoslav Controversy , ed. by Bass
and Marbury, pp. 55-60.
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five year trade agreement made in 19bl.
delations between the two states remained more or
less cordial throughout the sixties until the Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav reaction was unanimously
against the blatant Soviet invasion and its so called just-
ification, the Brezhnev Doctrine. The reaction to the inter-
vention came from Tito himself, the government, and the
party. A typical reaction is the Resolution adopted by the
Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the LYC on August
23, 19bti. It stated categorically that the, "Various nation-
alities express their deep indignation and protest against
the occupation of Czechoslovakia." 00
The Soviet rationale for the intervention, the Brezhnev
Doctrine, received a similiar response in Yugoslavia. The
Brezhnev Doctrine justifies intervention in the socialist
states of Eastern iSurope at any time the interests of the
wording class and its vanguard, the Communist Party, are
threatened. The sole judge of when this is the case, Is,
of course, the Soviet Union. This goes directly against tne
Belgrade Declaration of 1935 which we have already cited.
Tnus, the Yugoslav reaction to this doctrine was unanamous-
ly critical. A noted Yugoslav jurist stated, "Our analysis
so far has shown that there is no written or unwritten
international law that would permit tne intervention of
^"Yugoslavia's Attitude on the Aggression on Czecho-
slovakia," Review of International Affairs , September 5,
1968, p. 14.
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"tn.6 war saw I’act countries in Czechoslovakia. '*91
Relations with the Soviet Union then returned to a
familiar pattern; correct at the governmental level, frigid
at the party level, and hostile in propaganda exchanges.
Yugoslav relations with the United States have generally
varied in reverse to the particular state of Yugoslav-Soviet
relations. For example, American contacts with Yugoslavia
in the wake of this recent dispute with the Soviet Union
increased enormously. Beginning in 1968, the following U.3.
officials paid visits to Yugoslavia: Nicholas Katzenbach,
Joseph Sisco, Frank Shakespeare, the crew of Apollo 11,
Morris Stance, G. Warren Nutter, and finally culminating
in President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia from September 30
to October 2, 1970. Nixon and Tito expressed their mutual
regard for each other and their respective countries while
acknowledging their differences. The visit was generally
considered to be enormously successful by both sides.
^
In order to increase Russian influence and to counter
increasing American influence in Yugoslavia, Leonid Brezhnev,
tne Soviet Communist Party head, paid a visit to Yugsslavia
from September 22 to the 25th, 1971. A new five year trade
agreement calling for the exchange of 2.6 billion dollars
worth of goods had been signed earlier in the year. The
91Vo,)in Dimitrijevic, "intervention and Aggression,”
Review of International Affairs , December 5, 1968, p. 25.'
92 ,,ihe Chronology of American- Yugoslav Relations,^
Review of International Affairs, October 20, 1971, pp. 1-3.
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Yugoslavs wanted Mr. Brezhnev to reaffirm the Belgrade
Declaration of 1955 and, by implication, reject the doctrine
bearing his name. The Yugoslavs seemed to have gotten what
they wanted. A communique issued at the end of the visit
stated, ‘Methods of building socialism are the concern of
the peoples and working class in individual countries and
should not be a matter of mutual aggression. '‘95
in keeping with this increased political activity,
President lito visited the United States from October 28
to November 2, 1971. The visit was described by Tito as
“very successful and usefull." A Joint statement states
that, "President Nixon reaffirmed the interest of the United
States in the independence and nonaligned position and pol-
icy of Yugoslavia." The two leaders stated their desire to
cooperate fully in the search for peace and for the equit-
able settlement of international disputes. 9^
Nothing illustrates more clearly the Yugoslav way of
playing the big powers of against each other as these recent
visits since 1968. The policy of nonalignment is often des-
cribed as a policy of independence and, in that respect,
nonalignment has certainly succeeded. Yugoslavia condemned
the United States presence in Southeast Asia throughout
93*'joint Yugoslav-Soviet Statement," Review of
International Affairs , October 5, 1971, p. 12.
9^
'Visit of the President of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, to the United
States of America October 28-November 2, 1971, ' Yugoslav
Facts and Views, November, 1971, pp. 1-30.
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the sixties, and at the same time vigorously criticized
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Yet cordial
visits are exchanged with both and trade continues with
both countries. The policy of nonalignment as a policy of
independence has allowed Yugoslavia to play an unique role
in international affairs and to maintain her independence
in a vulnerable, strategic area of the world.
However, one area in which the policy of nonaligned
Yugoslavia has not proved particularly effective is in
solving her nationality problems. Vie noted in an earlier
chapter that one of the appeals of nonalignment to under-
developed countries was that such a policy would tend to
unify an ethnically diverse state. Nonalignment has not
done this for Yugoslavia but I doubt if either an align-
ment with the West or with the East would nave had any dif-
ferent result.
nationality rivalries, particularly Serbian-Croatian
rivalry, have a long history in Yugoslavia. Briefly, Serbians
were and are Eastern Orthodox while the Croatians are Roman
Catholic. They speak the same language but write in differ-
ent scripts. They fought a bitter civil war during World
War 11 in addition to that waged by the Partisans and the
Chetniks. Now, there is some feeling that the Serbians dom-
inate the LYC. This has some basis as 51.7 per cent of the
LYC are Serbians wheras the next highest nationality is
the Croatians making up 18.13 per cent of the LYC. -Ibo,
there is an economic aspect involved. The official line
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supported by Serbia and the underdeveloped republics of
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina favor more
economic centralization so that they can get more investment
in their republics. Croatia and Slovenia favor decentraliza-
tion because they want to retain their capital for their
own use and not see it invested in other republics. In the
face of these deep and complex antagonisms, it is doubtful
whether any foreign policy would make any difference. How-
ever, it would appear that recognition of the fact that any
disintegration into smaller states would leave each extreme-
ly vulnerable would do much to keep Yugoslavia intact even
if at a less unified level .
^
The policy of nonaligned Yugoslavia has also served
to give her a prestige and an ideological impact far above
that normally allotted to a small undeveloped country.
President Nixon noted this when, after commenting on the
large number of world leaders President Tito has personal-
ly met, stated, "This means that one who is so fortunate
to have the opportunity to talk to him is able to talk to
one who is as well informed, if not better informed, than
any world leader in all the world today. This tells us
something about both the man and his country. "9b
In addition, tne policy of nonalignment has allowed
95tfayne S. Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism,'* in
Contemporary Yugoslavia , ed. by Wayne S. Vucinich, pp. 2 ^6-
2W.
96
"Tito 1 s Visit to the U.S.," Yugoslav lacts and Views ,
November, 1971> P» 5.
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Yugoslavia to liberalize internally and make imaginative
political and economic innovations while still retaining
or claiming to retain a socialist structure. This has served
to satisfy both hard line communists and more liberal mem-
bers oi Yugoslavia. However, the new generation no longer
snares tne emotional and ideological ties to Moscow that
i'ito, KardelJ, and some of the older communists still do.
Thus, they may question a policy of nonalignment if it does
not realistically serve specific Yugoslav needs in the
future
.
Finally, one of the main reasons Yugoslavia undertook
a policy of nonalignment was economic. Finding herself out-
side of 00MS00N and not wanting to Join the EEC for ideolog-
ical reasons, Yugoslavia turned to the Third World as an
economic partner. For the most part the results have been
disappointing. Her biggest trading partner in the Third
World is India with one hundred million dollars worth of
trade in 1967. However, trade witn the Third World never
reached as much as eighteen per cent of Yugoslav exports
or fifteen per cent of imports, in 1970 for example, the
developing countries accounted for 11.3 per cent of Yugo-
slav imports and only 10.4 per cent of Yugoslav exports.
Basically, the developing countries do not produce the
capital goods and manufactured items needed by Yugoslavia
who has to develop herself. Also, the developing nations
naturally trade with their former metropole where trade
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activities are already organized and established. However,
Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Foreign Trade Hadzic has ex-
pressed interest in increasing trade with developing nations
even to tne point of possible trade preferences to develop-
ing countries .
^
Another aspect is Yugoslavia's aid to developing
countries. For the most part, this aid has taken the form
of credits and technical advice. Yugoslavia has extended
over 750 million dollars in credit over the years to devel-
oping countries. The usual credit arrangement for this is
three per cent over a period of seven years. Also, in any
given year several thousand Yugoslav engineers and tech-
nicians are in developing countries aiding in internal pro-
jects. Of course this aid, tnough appreciated, can only be
a very small percentage of the needs of tne developing states.
For Yugoslavia, the advantages sought and those gained are
mainly political.
The other effects of nonalignment on Yugoslavia's
economy are less easily seen. The Yugoslav economy, while
growing substantially, is beset by several important prob-
lems. One of which is severe unemployment. Unemployment in
Yugoslavia at seven per cent in 1970, down from eight per
cent in 1969. However, this is a misleading figure in that
it does not include tne estimated one million Yugoslavs
9/jyluhamed Hadzic, "Present Trends and Problems in
Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade," Review of international
Affairs, April 5, 19/1. PP. '13-15.
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working in other lands, fifty per cent of whom are in the
federal republic of Germany, * Although this is somewhat of
a safety valve, many of the Yugoslavs leave permanently
after acquiring a skilled trade. This is a situation Yugo-
slavia can ill afford. The advantages of working in the
West above the fact that there are Jobs include higner wages
and better vocational training facilities. This large num-
ber of Yugoslavs working abroad has political implications
as well. Those Yugoslavs that return to Yugoslavia inev-
itably compare conditions in Western Europe with those in
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia comes out second best politically
and economically. It is significant that of the total num-
ber of on® million Yugoslavs working abroad, five hundred
thousand are Oroatians. Eagreb, the capital of Croatia,
has recently been the scene of riots protesting the pol-
98itical and economic situation in Yugoslavia.
Another serious problem with the Yugoslav economy is
tne increasing balance of payments and foreign trade def-
icits. There was a record trade deficit in 1970 of 1.2
billion dollars, 81 per cent greater than that of 1969.
Tne balance of payments deficit was 388 million dollars in
1970. Yugoslavia's largest single trading partner, West
Germany, alone accounted for a 3°9 million dollar trade
deficit, nearly one-third of the total deficit. Yugoslavia's
^Aleksandar Petkovic, "Yugoslav Workers Abroad,"
Review of Internat lonal Affairs, May 5, 1971, PP. 28-30.
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top trading partners are In order: .Vest Germany, Italy,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.
COMECON countries only accounted for about 23 per cent of
total Yugoslav foreign trade in 1970. The large trade def-
icit stems almost entirely from trade with Western devel-
oped countries. Exports to Yugoslavia in 1970 from Western
developed states were 63.9 per cent of total Yugoslav im-
ports. Yet Western developed states received only 36.3 per
cent of Yugoslav exports In 1970. ^
Yugoslavia has tried to remedy this adverse situation.
She was an observer witli the OEEC and has representatives
at OECD, the successor organization. It also was a member
of the European Payments Union. Yugoslavia joined GATT as
a full member in I9o ( and is an associate member of COMECON.
It was tne first East European country to sign a trade
agreement with the Common Market. This was a three year non
preferential, non discriminatory trade agreement concluded
in February 1970. 10°
Yugoslavia has tried to play the twro blocs of against
each other economically as she did so well politically. It
has not worked. As the statistics show, Yugoslavia's natural
trade outlets are with the West. Only the West can provide
99u.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic
Trends, Yugoslavia (American Embassy, Belgrade: ,
1971), pp. 1-S.
100 &ub inst e in
,
Yugoslavia and tne Ko nai ,
p. 182.
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tne manufactured items and skilled technology that Yugoslavia
herself needs to develop. Yet, she must trade with the Com-
mon Market countries on an unequal footing because she is
not a member, and this accounts in large measure for her
adverse trade deficit. Yet, the policy of nonalignment dic-
tates that she remain unassociated closely with the West
or the 3ast. Yugoslavia's best position in an economic sense
is to become a member of the Common Market or as closely
associated with it as is possible. The policy of nonalign-
ment by forestalling this has blinded the Jugoslavs to
their own best position. The Yugoslavs may have become as
dogmatically attached to nonalignment as they were to inter-
national communism before 19^8, and this can only act to
their detriment
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CHAPTER VI
THE FUTURE OF NOHAL IGUMS NT
It seems clear that nonalignment as an international
movement has lost much of its earlier vitality and impor-
tance. Of course, the movement may survive as sort of an
international forum where Third World states may gather and
exchange views on mutual problems and international rela-
tions in general. Nonalignment may exert some influence in
international organizations such as the United Nations,
but even tnere its influence is limited. The reasons for
this decline in importance and influence are not difficult
to ascertain.
First, we may mention the general trend to an inter-
national system of multipolarity rather than the tight bi-
polar system of the Cold War era. Closely aligned with this
development is the lessening of bloc cohesiveness on both
sides. This has led to a blurring of the definition of non-
alignment. For example, is France or Romania unaligned or
part of their respective blocs? Communist China has emerged
as a third center of power in the world today and yet claims
to be tne leader of the nonaligned world. In short, nonalign
ment has lost much of its meaning as an antithesis to blocs
when the blocs have become less well ieimed and less co-
hesive
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Another factor is the death of or the ouster of many
of the charismatic leaders of the earlier period. Nehru,
Nasser, Suxarno, J Nu, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, and others have
all left the scene. The new class of leaders who are now
in power in the Third World reflect a growing maturity and
sophistication on the part of the Third World. For the most
part, these leaders are more concerned with practical real-
istic problems such as economic development, illiteracy,
poverty and hunger than with far flung decorative confer-
ences.
We have already mentioned the lack of effectiveness
of the policy of nonalignment. This, more than anything
else, simply reflects the military, economic, and polit-
ical weakness of the countries professing that policy. They
have not been able to solve any of the major international
disputes such as Vietnam, the Middle East, or the recent
dispute in South Asia. They have not been able to end the
rascist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, one of their
favorite planks. Sven within the United Nations, their in-
fluence has been minimal due to their lack of economic and
military power and the internal structure of that organiza-
tion.
Finally, we must add the growing concern of the super-
powers with detente between themselves rather than a world
wide struggle for influence. There are many examples of tnis,
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty being one of the most
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significant. The continuing SALT talks and proposals for
a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe and
an all Europe security conference are examples of this on
going activity. One of the side effects of this activity
has been the relative decline in importance of the Third
tforld. In retrospect, one must say that nonalignment was
important as an international movement only as long as the
superpowers considered it so.
Uonalignment as a foreign policy for Yugoslavia has
likewise lost much of its effectiveness. The rationale for
adopting nonalignment really no longer holds true for Yugo-
slavia. Nonalignment did serve to maintain Yugoslavia's
political independence during the last twenty turbulent
years. However, is there any longer a real danger of Yugo-
slavia losing her independence? I do not think so. The
Soviet Union has long accepted the fact that Yugoslavia is
no longer a member of the East European bloc and, realizing
this fact, the Soviet Union still desires friendly relations
with Yugoslavia. With a growing detente in Europe, this
rationale for nonalignment seems to no longer be in effect.
The main reason Yugoslavia clings to a policy of non-
alignment is the nature of her present leadership. President
Tito, Kardelj and other long term members of the League of
Yugoslav Communists continue to be faithful adherents to
socialism to which they have devoted their entire lives.
There can be no doubt as to their feelings in tnis regard.
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However, the younger generation has not the same deep Ideo-
logical ties to socialism as these do who participated in
the early struggles for that cause. On the contrary, the
new generation has turned more and more to the West as an
example of political, economic, and cultural advancement.
Moreover, it is doubtful that the next leaders of Yugoslavia
will have the same penchant for international influence as
President Tito obviously has. It is equally doubtful whether
the new leaders will exercise the same skill at achieving
this international leadership as President Tito has demon-
strated. It is very likely that the successors to the present
generation of Yugoslav leaders will be more Western oriented
politically and economically.
Finally, the most influential reasons for closer ties
with tne West and an abandonment of nonalignment are econ-
omic. Yugoslavia^ natural trading partners, and those of
most use to her, are Western, especially the Common Market.
It Is often forgotten that Yugoslavia is still a rather
poor and undeveloped country. Her per capita income in 1969
was only #p20. Close association with the West offers her
the best road to economic development. A closer association
witn tne Common Market would do much to reduce her cripp-
ling trade deficit. A strict Interpretation of nonalignment
bars these beneficial economic moves. Finally, economic
prosperity and an equitable distribution oi Income among
the different nationalities would do much to alleviate,
Ill
though not solve, the ethnic antagonisms which threaten to
dismember Yugoslavia.
For the reasons mentioned above, Yugoslavia should
and probably will in time, abandon the policy of nonalign-
ment and seek membership in the Common Market and a closer
association with the West in general.
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